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The Eurpean framework for creditor protection has undergone a remarkable
tansfomation in recent years. While the European Court of Justice s Centros case and its
progeny have given European Union businesses bee choice with respect to the state of
incorporation, and hence to the substantive corporate law regime, the European Insolvency
Regulation has introduced uniform conflict-of-law rules for insolvencies. However, this regime
has opened up some forum shopping opportunities for corporate debtors. Both regulatory
competition in corporate law and forum shopping in bankruptcy law have been discussed in the
United States foryears, whie they are relative4ynew territoryin the European Union.
Tis article attempts to pull together the two emerging discussions and analyzes possible
consequences for the relationship between sharholdes, managers, and creditors in European
corporations. We argue thatin the absence of evidence of eithera race to the top or the bottom,
we cannot rule out adverse consequences of either regulatory competition in corporate law or
forum shopping in banAruptcy However, the hiscussion so far has large4' considered only the
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consequences of the firs t type ofregulatory arbitage while neglecting the second Hence, the
issue of the 'nsolvencification" of corporate law rules has been brought up in order to enable
nationalpolicymakers to impose their respective ideas about creditor protection on urms. We
suggest that such attempts may be futile.
Firs4 relabeling is possible only to a rather lirmited degree, and second while resricting
the scope for corporate law arbitrage, relabeling increases the incentives for forum shopping in
bankruptcy Ultimately relabeling may even backfuie, leading to a higher degree of banl-uptcy
forum shopping to avoid the very rules thathave been insolvencifed
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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate about regulatory competition and interaction between
different legislative and regulatory levels has a long pedigree in U.S.
corporate law scholarship. Scholars have argued for more than thirty
years that states vying for incorporations have caused corporate law to
race to the top,' to the bottom,' or to nowhere in particular.3 Since the
early 1990s, following empirical evidence of forum shopping by large
corporate debtors, a related debate has developed with respect to
1. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 212-27 (1991); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory ofthe Corporation 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 290 (1977); Ralph K. Winter, The
'Race for the Top" Revisited" A Comment on Eisenber, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1526, 1528
(1989). See generally ROBERTA RoMANo, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-31
(1993).
2. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The
Race To Protect Managers frvm Takeover 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1168, 1171-82 (1999); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation. The Desirable Limits on State Competition
in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1483-84 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974).
3. See William W Bratton, Corporate Lawfs Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U.
TORONTO L.J. 401, 401 (1994). For revisionist views denying the relevance of interstate
competition, see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 684-85 (2002); Mark J. Roe, Delaware&s Competition, 117 HARV.
L. REv. 588, 591-93 (2003) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Competition]; and Mark J. Roe,
Delawares Politics 118 HARV. L. REv. 2491, 2495-96 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware'
Politics].
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bankruptcy law.4 Some scholars suggest that forum shopping between
different federal bankruptcy courts has allowed corporate debtors to
ensure that bankruptcy proceedings are conducted in the most efficient
way possible The opposing camp argues that forum shopping is
essentially destroying the bankruptcy system to the detriment of
creditors and to the benefit of the managers who have led firms into
bankruptcy.6
Good old Europe, as so often, is different. Little was heard about
regulatory competition in either field from the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean until recently, because the regulatory environment in
the European Union (EU) simply did not allow any. However, this has
changed drastically during the last few years. In March of 1999, the
European Court of Justice's (ECJ) Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og
Selskabsstyvelsen decision paved the way for corporate law arbitrage
within the EU by granting European businesses the right to
incorporate in any EU Member State (State or Member State), no
matter where their business is run.' Correspondingly, the ruling
prevents Member States from imposing their own corporate law on
such businesses, other than under very limited conditions.8 In the last
few years, newly incorporated businesses have started to take
advantage of this new development, choosing English law in relatively
high numbers
4. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis.
L. REv. 11, 12.
5. See Marcus Cole, 'Delaware Is Not a State" Are We Witnessing Juisdictional
Competition in Bankruptcy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1859-76 (2002); Robert K. Rasmussen
& Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent
Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1358-59 (2000); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy
Judges and Banlkruptcy Venue- Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1998)
[hereinafter Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue]; David A. Skeel, Jr., Whats So
BadAbout Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REv. 309, 328 (2001) [hereinafter Skeel, Whats So Bad
About Delaware.1; Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., WhyDo Distressed Companies
Choose Delaware? An EmpiricalAnalysis of Venue Choice in Bankruptcy 15 (Univ. Pa. Inst.
for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 03-29, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-
463001.
6. See LYNN M. LoPuciu, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES Is
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The
Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empir'cal Evidence of
a 'Race to the Bottom, "54 VAND. L. REv. 231,270 (2001).
7. See Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 1-1497 to 98; see also infra text
accompanying notes 58-61.
8. See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1497 to 98.
9. See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus
Regulatory Competition, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 369, 386 (2005) (providing data on so-
580 [Vol. 81:577
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Independent of this new development, the European Community
(EC) adopted an important piece of legislation on bankruptcy law a
year after Centros: EC Council Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency
proceedings (EIR).'° The EIR identifies the Member State that has
jurisdiction to open main proceedings having a universal effect (at least
within the EU and with some important exceptions) as the place where
the debtor has its "centre of main interests" (COMI)." Most
importantly, it identifies the law applicable to insolvency proceedings
as the law of the State of the court opening the proceedings."
However, the fuzziness of the COMI standard has allowed some forum
shopping, which can be observed in emerging case law on the EIR.'3
In short, both Centros and the EIR have increased the scope of
private parties' free choice in determining the law applicable to
companies and their insolvency. By allowing corporate law arbitrage
and bankruptcy forum shopping, Europe has become similar to the
United States. Yet, there is still one crucial difference. While creditors
are a concern of corporate law only to a very limited degree in the
United States, EU Member States have traditionally tried to protect
corporate creditors through corporate law.4 And while the U.S. debate
on regulatory competition is almost exclusively focused on the
relationship between shareholders and managers, the relationship with
creditors cannot be ignored in its European analogue. At the same
time, because both corporate law and bankruptcy law are concerned
with creditors, the two levels of regulatory arbitrage need to be dealt
with as two sides of the same coin.
called "GmbH limited," i.e., German businesses incorporated as English private-limited
companies); Alexander Schall, The UK Limited Company Abroad-How Foreign Cre&tors
Are Protected Alter Inspire Art (Including a Companson of UK and German Creditor
Protection Rules), 2005 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 1534, 1535 (reporting estimates that there are
more than 20,000 U.K. limited companies (Ltds) with their real seat in Germany); see also
Marco Becht et al., Where Do Fins Incorporate? (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law
Working Paper No. 70/2006, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=906066 (providing
evidence on other Member States businesses' incorporations in the United Kingdom).
10. Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 [hereinafter ELR].
11. Id. art. 3.
12. Id. art. 4.
13. Horst Eidenmiiller, Free Choice in International Company Insolvency Law in
Europe, 6 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 423,428 (2005).
14. See Katharina Pistor et al., Evolution of Corpoate Law and the Transplant Effect:
Lessons from Six Countries, WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, Spring 2003, at 89, 108. See
generally Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Cre&tors Versus Capital Formation: The
CaseAgainst the European Legal CapitalRules, 86 CORNELL L. RE. 1165 (2001).
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Our Article attempts to pull the two issues together and to analyze
how they shape the relationship between corporate debtors and their
creditors. In order to do so, in Part II we first sketch out how different
jurisdictions may interact with each other in regulating the relationship
between companies and their creditors, first in general and then within
the EC framework. The emphasis will be on the varying degree of
deference to private parties' choices that derives from States' private
international law rules and on its implications for regulatory
competition.
We will next show, in Part III, that past efforts at positive
harmonization of corporate law by the EC have failed to make EU
corporate laws equivalent in terms of creditor protection, so some
jurisdictions may be more attractive than others to those who make the
(re)incorporation choice. We argue that while some companies may
reincorporate in order to exploit some categories of creditors, a race to
the bottom is unlikely to develop within the EU and there is currently
no conclusive evidence of a race to the bottom or to the top.
We then turn in Part IV to the EIR and its implications for the
relationship between EU companies and their creditors. After briefly
describing its main provisions, we turn to regulatory arbitrage with
respect to insolvency law. We will show that the EIR leaves some
possibility for arbitrage, because a switch of COMI by a corporate
debtor on the brink of insolvency is not effectively prevented.
However, we will also show that because it is most often creditors who
file for bankruptcy in the EU, regulatory arbitrage is a weapon in their
hands too. Subsequently, we argue that it is unrealistic to expect any
EU Member State to supply debtor-friendly insolvency law rules in
order to prosper as a bankruptcy venue.
In order to pull the two issues together, in Part V we finally
discuss "relabeling": the idea that by qualifying a corporate law
provision as an insolvency law one, it may apply to insolvent
companies with a COMI in the relevant jurisdiction no matter where
the company is incorporated. We highlight an important implication
of relabeling that has been overlooked in the literature so far, which is
the fact that it may increase the regulatory surplus to be gained from
insolvency forum shopping. We suggest that relabeling may not
necessarily be desirable if arbitrage gains are shifted from corporate
law to insolvency law. Part VI concludes.
582 [Vol. 81:577
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II. REGULATORY INTERACTIONS AMONG JURISDICTIONS
All jurisdictions impose mandatory rules aimed at protecting
creditors vis-A-vis their (corporate) debtors. In a multijurisdictional
setting, however, it may be possible for private parties to avoid such
rules by choosing a different jurisdiction not imposing them whenever
it is in their interest. The choice will be made either jointly by debtors
and their voluntary creditors or unilaterally by the debtors with the
creditors giving tacit consent by agreeing to enter into a relationship
with the debtors or by not reserving ex ante the right to veto such a
choice. Of course, involuntary creditors and, more generally,
nonadjusting creditors can never be said to give consent to this kind of
choice.'5 Because they have a credit relationship with the corporate
debtor whom they have entered into an agreement with unwillingly or
whose terms they are unable or unwilling to renegotiate (in order to
react to unilateral moves by the debtor), they can only bear the venue
choice's consequences."
This Part evaluates in general terms the degree to which States
may defer to free choice of law in the realm of the creditor/corporate
debtor relationship and the various means through which they can limit
such a choice. We also briefly outline the implications of multiple
jurisdictions' options with regard to private parties' choice. Our focus
in this Part will be mainly on corporate law, but the analysis can be
easily extended to securities regulation and insolvency law.'7 For
analytical purposes, we will look first at possible interactions among
States in the absence of supranational institutions restraining
jurisdictions' options with regard to substantive regulation and/or
conflicts of law.'8 Then we will introduce one such institution, the EC,
into the framework.'9
15. Nonadjusting creditors are those that do not "adjust" the terms of their claims to
anticipate or take into account the effects of new developments. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Pdoity of Secured Clains in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE
L.J. 857, 864 (1996).
16. See id
17. Needless to say, while tort law is sometimes used as a means to protect creditors
(even voluntary ones) against (corporate) debtors' opportunism, tort law is of no concern here
because it makes little sense to talk about free choice with regard to it.
18. See infia Part II.A.
19. See infia Part I.B.
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A. RegulatoryIntemctions i the Absence of Coopemtion
Jurisdictions' attitudes toward choice of law range from absolute
negation of free choice to absolute respect for it.2" In the former case,
rules are imposed on companies (or transactions) having a meaningful
connection to the relevant jurisdiction, no matter what private parties'
choice of law is. In the latter case, there are no restrictions on free
choice of law, but for the fact that normally one can opt-out of a single
mandatory rule only by choosing another jurisdiction for a whole class
of transactions and conducts.2' For example, one can opt out of the
German rule on minimum capital for limited liability companies
(Gesellschalten mit beschrnker Hafiung (GmbHs)) only by choosing
a different jurisdiction to regulate the firm as a corporation."2
1. Choice-Denying Techniques
A jurisdiction can effectively deprive private parties of free
choice of corporate law by providing that its own corporate law applies
if a corporation has a sufficiently strong connection with it. Most
commonly, what counts is where the "real seat" (whatever this means)
is located.23  Whenever a corporation's real seat is within a
jurisdiction's borders, any incorporators' choice of a foreign law is
disregarded, leading to the nonrecognition of the foreign entity.4
The real-seat doctrine can be symmetric or asymmetric. In the
former case, a jurisdiction does not accept a foreign firm's choice of
that jurisdiction's corporate law unless the firm establishes its real seat
within the territory (this is the case, for example, in Germany)." In
other words, the symmetric real-seat doctrine implies a self-imposed
20. See inlfr notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
21. See Benjamin Angelette, Note, The Revolution that Never Came and the
Revolution Coming-De Lasteyrie du Salliant, Marks & Spencer, Sevic Systems and the
Changing Corporate Lawin Europe, 92 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1200-01 (2006).
22. See id.
23. Werner E Ebke, The 'Real Seat"Doctrrne in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 36
INT'LLAW. 1015, 1034-36 (2002).
24. See id But see Case C-208/00, O]berseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co.
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919; see also, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 21, 1986, 97 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes
in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 269 (ER.G.); Bernhard Grol3feld, Intemationales Geselschaflsrecht,
i7 JULIUS VON STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT
EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ UNDNEBENGESETZEN cmt. 26 (13th ed. 1998).
25. See Ebke, supra note 23, at 1034-35.
584 [Vol. 81:577
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export ban on a jurisdiction's corporate law.6 In the latter case, no
such export ban is self-imposed and a foreign firm is free to choose the
relevant jurisdiction's corporate law, no matter where their real seat is
located (as is the case in Italy).
When the real-seat doctrine governs, the only way to escape the
reach of mandatory rules will be to locate (or relocate) the
corporation's real seat in another jurisdiction, which can of course be
costly. 8 How costly will, of course, depend on how "real" the real seat
must be and on how international the company's operation is. 9
Moving one's headquarters implies that at least the human capital
needed to direct the firm be moved, while the (re)location will imply
that some other laws and regulations from the relocation State will
apply to the firm's headquarters, such as labor and income tax laws."
2. Choice-Restricting Techniques
The asymmetric real-seat doctrine can hardly be distinguished
from a pseudo-foreign corporation statute that declares domestic
corporate law overall applicable to domestic businesses (however
defined) incorporating as foreign companies.' Often, however,
pseudo-foreign corporation statutes overimpose a subset of domestic
rules not comprising the entire corporate law body, the rest deferring to
the law of the state of incorporation. 2  Of course, the more
26. See id. at 1036; see also Eva Micheler, §254, in 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM
AKTIENGESETZ cmt. 38 (Peter Doralt et al. eds., 2003) (reporting that in Austria the prevailing
opinion is a shareholder resolution to relocate to another country results in the dissolution of
the corporation).
27. See Law No. 218 of may 31, 1995 art. 25, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica
Italiana [Gazz. Uff.] [Official Gazette of Italy], june 3, 1995, No. 128 (Italy).
28. See Becht, Mayer & Wagner, supra note 9, at 6 & n. 10.
29. For instance, in Germany the headquarters only have to be located within its
territory; in Italy, Italian corporate law also applies if the principal place of business is in Italy,
thus making companies operating mainly in Italy more captive to Italian corporate law than
German ones to German law. See Law No. 218 of may 31, 1995 art. 25 (Italy); Seth Chertok,
Jurisdictional Competition in the European Communit,, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 465,482-
84(2006).
30. See Becht et al., supra note 9, at 6 & n.10.
31. See Hanne Sondergaard Birkmose, A Market for Company Incorporations in the
European Union?-Is Uberseering the Beginning of the End 13 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
55, 93-94 (2005).
32. Id. at 95. Such was the case with Dutch law on pseudo-foreign corporations the
ECJ struck down in its Inspire Art judgment. Case C-167/0 1, Kamer van Koophandel en
Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10,155 (striking down Wet op
de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen [Law on Formally Foreign Companies] of Dec.
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encompassing the subset of domestic rules, the more limited the
private parties' free choice.
A private party's free choice can also be restricted by making
national rules applicable to foreign entities, no matter where their real
seat is located." Although this is uncommon in the corporate law area,
it is normally what happens, with due qualifications, in securities
regulation and insolvency law. National securities regulation
traditionally applies to foreign issuers as long as they offer their
securities, or their securities are widely traded, in the relevant
jurisdiction." In a strictly territorialist setting, national insolvency law
usually applies to firms having assets in the relevant jurisdiction, no
matter what their nationality is or where their real seat is located, but
only to assets within the jurisdiction."
Finally, jurisdictions always reserve the general power to refuse
the application of foreign (corporate) law under the public policy
exception, which leaves judges the option to apply domestic law if the
outcome deriving from application of the relevant foreign law would
contrast with fundamental principles and values. 6
3. Deference to Free Choice
Jurisdictions may also decide to put no limits on private parties'
free choice. In the corporate law domain, this is the case whenever the
choice-of-law rules follow the incorporation doctrine and none of the
choice-restricting techniques outlined above are deployed." The only
element of inflexibility derives from the fact that, as already hinted, by
incorporating in a given State, companies subject themselves to the
State's whole set of corporate law rules. 8 In other words, a company
17, 1997, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] [Official Gazette of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands], Apr. 28, 2005, No. 230).
33. Such is traditionally the case with securities regulation. See infra text
accompanying note 34.
34. See Harald Baum, Globalizing Capital Markets and Possible Regulatory
Responses, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTERNET, CAPITAL
MARKETS AND INSOLVENCY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 77, 90-93 (Jirgen Basedow & Toshiyuki
Kono eds., 2000).
35. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism,
98 MICH. L. REv. 2177, 2179 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Case C-208/00, Oberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919.
37. See supra Part II.A.2.
38. See Mathias M. Siems, The Rules on Conflict of Laws in the European Takeover
Directive, 1 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REv. 458, 475 (2004) ("The concept of regulatory
competition means that you can opt into the rules of one particular legal system, but not that
586 [Vol. 81:577
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may not engage in "cherry picking" choosing State A's corporate law
rules on, e.g., minimum net assets and State B's corporate law rules on,
e.g., directors' liability.
This is less the case, however, with regard to relationships with
creditors in two ways. First, because traditionally these rules are in
part corporate law and in part insolvency law, as long as conflict-of-
law rules differ with regard to the two bodies of law, it might be
possible to select one State's corporate law and another State's
insolvency law.39 Second, a corporation and one of its creditors or
classes of creditors might agree that they would be better off if the
applicable corporate law were a different one than that otherwise
applying to the corporation. They could create a corporate vehicle in
the State of their choice and make it the corporate debtor in their
relationship. By doing so, they would choose their favorite corporate
law without any need to change the corporate law regulating
relationships among shareholders, between shareholders and
managers, and between shareholders and other creditors. Of course,
they will do so only if the advantages of the corporate law of choice
more than offset the disadvantages deriving from the fact that only the
vehicle will be liable for the corporate debt." This may happen only
when a viable business is assigned to the corporate vehicle, as the case
may be in a conglomerate.
Jurisdictions can defer to free choice to varying degrees, even
leaving aside the possibility for the use of the choice-restricting
techniques described in Part II.A.2. First, a jurisdiction may opt for
geographically-restricted free choice, i.e., limited to one or more other
jurisdictions." Normally, this will be the outcome of some form of
cooperation among States, like a treaty for the reciprocal recognition
of companies." Second, free choice can be granted either at the
incorporation stage only or midstream as well thereby allowing
you can freely combine the law of different countries ... "); Nicole Rothe, Comment,
Freedom of Establishment ofLegal Persons Within the European Union: An Analysis of the
European Court of Justice Decision in the Uberseering Case, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1103, 1110
(2004).
39. See infra Part IV
40. Unless the parent guarantees that debt, in which case of course the corporate law
of the parent would come back to the foreground.
41. This is the effective result of the ECJ case law, which allows free choice within
the European Economic Area (EEA). See infia Part II.B.
42. See generally Patrick B. Griffin, The Delaware Effect: Keeping the Tiger in Its
Cage. The European Experience of Mutual Recognition in Financial Serices, 7 COLUM. J.
EuR. L. 337 (2001).
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companies to choose a State's law at a later time. In the former case,
incorporators are free to choose any given jurisdiction's corporate law.
If, however, they choose the domestic one, they cannot change their
mind later. If they choose another jurisdiction, they cannot
reincorporate as a domestic corporation later. In the latter case, a
choice made at the outset can be modified later. It is also possible that
restrictions could be placed on outbound, or, less likely, inbound,
midstream reincorporations, such as laws granting existing creditors
the right to veto reincorporations.
4. Implications for Interjurisdictional Interaction
Let us now briefly comment on whether and to what extent States
are affected by each other's choices in regulating the relationships
between creditors and corporate debtors.
If all the relevant jurisdictions adopt the real-seat doctrine, States
would face very low constraints on their freedom to design mandatory
corporate law rules due to the potentially high costs of reincorporating
abroad. Their only concerns could be that domestic businesses might
suffer a competitive disadvantage, e.g., a higher cost of debt financing,
vis-A-vis businesses from other States or, similarly, that the State would
be at a disadvantage in attracting foreign investment. At best, the fact
that other jurisdictions better regulate companies can only prompt
changes when it is felt that those rules translate into a regulatory
environment more conducive to corporate investment or more
generally into a more effective and business-friendly set of rules. 3
When this happens, it means that policymakers are genuinely
concerned about preserving or enhancing their country's ability to
attract investment." They care about "yardstick competition"' 5 leading
to "regulatory emulation" among the States in some cases. 46
43. See Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725,
1731-43 (2006) (describing the various methods European countries have used to attract
investment).
44. See id.
45. See Pierre Salmon, Political Yardstick Competition and Corporate Governance in
the European Union, in INVESTOR PROTECTION IN EUROPE: CORPORATE LAW MAKING, THE
MiFID AND BEYOND 31, 41-44 (Guido Ferrarini & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2006).
46. See Stephen Woolcock, Competition Among Rules in the Single European
Marke4 in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 289, 298 (William Bratton et al.
eds., 1996).
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To the extent that at least one jurisdiction allows for free choice,
and at least one other jurisdiction adopts the asymmetric real-seat
doctrine, a market for rules exists. Only States adopting the symmetric
real-seat doctrine are totally out of such a market. Those States
adopting the asymmetric real-seat doctrine enter the market, but only
as suppliers of corporate law rules, impeding access to their own"consumers." Jurisdictions adopting choice-restricting techniques, in
turn, not only enter the market as suppliers of corporate law rules, but
also allow their consumers to choose. Nevertheless, their consumers'
choice is constrained, because freedom of choice cannot be used to
escape those rules that also apply to (pseudo-)foreign corporations.
The higher the number of jurisdictions that allow choice, the
deeper and potentially more dynamic the market. More precisely, the
degree of dynamism and competition in a market for rules depends on
a number of factors. Examples include: how easy it is to exercise free
choice; how relevant the differences among existing jurisdictions are,
i.e., how big the regulatory surplus that can be obtained by moving is;
whether any jurisdiction and its policymakers are willing and able to
attract foreign incorporations; and so on.
When free choice is a real option in practice and no jurisdiction
cares about attracting foreign corporations, some form of weak,
"defensive" regulatory competition can develop, in which States adapt
their laws to the more attractive features of other jurisdictions in order
to retain existing, and lure prospective, domestic companies. In the
absence of a clear maximand, such as franchise tax revenue in
Delaware,47 States will take into account the interests of all
stakeholders that have some influence on the political process. Hence,
any effects regulatory competition may have on the development of the
law will be mitigated. Although shareholders, as the group deciding
where to incorporate, have a structural advantage over creditors in
regulatory competition, legislation beneficial to the former and
detrimental to (nonadjusting) creditors need not necessarily ensue if
creditors have sufficient political representation or can gain the support
of well-organized interest groups, such as trade unions and trade
associations.
If one jurisdiction actively engages in attracting (re)incorpora-
tions from abroad, a situation very similar to the current situation in the
47. See Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26
CARDOzO L. REv. 127, 157-59 (2004); Cary, supra note 2, at 668-69.
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United States, as described by Robert Daires, exists: each of the
market participants competes with the active jurisdiction (Delaware in
the United States) for (re)incorporations of its domestic companies."
In other words, there is not one single market for incorporations, but
rather n minus one markets, if n is the number of jurisdictions leaving
free choice to their businesses and where there are two suppliers for
each market: "Delaware" and the home state.49
Of course, such a multiple-market setting can be very competitive
as long as "Delaware" remains active in attracting (re)incorporations.
In fact, "Delaware" will not only itself innovate, but it will also
respond to any attractive market innovation by one of its competitors;
this response, in turn, will prompt a response from each of the other
competitors."0 In such a case, regulatory competition may entail
interjurisdictional "externalities," whereby rules have an effect on
constituencies located outside the state, while only groups located
within the state are taken into account in the political process.' This
may have detrimental effects on creditors if they are disproportionately
located outside the state of incorporation.
As already seen, defensive regulatory competition in the absence
of a "Delaware" can raise no worry about such externalities. States
typically have to take the interests of both shareholders and creditors
into account and, therefore, "internalize" the effects of any corporate
law reform through the political process. Even before that, the
interests of relevant stakeholders would be taken into account no less
than in any "isolated" corporate law reform effort. 2 However, in the
presence of a "Delaware," jurisdictions may have to sacrifice these
interests if they want to retain their corporations by enacting legislation
benefiting shareholders and managers, but possibly harming
nonadjusting creditors.
Finally, one can imagine a scenario in which various jurisdictions
actively compete in order to attract incorporations. Such was the case
48. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 NYU. L. REV.
1559, 1575 (2002).
49. Seeid. at 1600.
50. See generally Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Imovation
andState Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006).
51. See Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo Vadis Z 37 CoMMoN MKT. L.
REv. 257, 289,294-98 (2000).
52. See Luca Enriques, EC Company Law and the Fears ofa European Delaware, 15
EuR. Bus. L. REV. 1259, 1274 (2004); Tobias H. Tr6ger, Choice of Jutisdiction in European
Corporate Law-Perspectives ofEuropean Corporate Governance, 6 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv.
3, 62 (2005).
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in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth." For various reasons that are not worth
exploring here, the conditions under which this scenario developed in
the United States at that time were quite unique, and, therefore, highly
unlikely to be reproduced." Intuitively, with multiple competitors
acting in the same market, the regulatory environment is most
conducive to innovation and rules that most cater to the interests of
those who make the decision on where to incorporate.
B. Regulatory InteractonsAmong Jurisdictons in the Presence of
Cooperaton: The EU Case
In the previous Subpart we analyzed a scenario of multiple
jurisdictions making uncoordinated, unilateral choices with regard to
free choice of corporate law. In this Part, we concentrate upon EU
Member States and briefly describe how the EC institutions can affect
regulatory interactions among jurisdictions with regard to free choice
and the substantive regulation of the relationships between creditors
and corporate debtors." The EC introduced a strong form of
cooperation into the framework of otherwise unilateral choices with
regard to regulatory interactions. We show that cooperation at the EC
level can lead to a higher or lower degree of deference toward private
parties' free choice (and hence contractual freedom and regulatory
competition), depending on whether the EC institutions foster
53. See Luca Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Corpomte Law, 52 Am. J.
CoMp. L. 1011, 1029-30 n.116 (2004) (reviewing RNER KRAAKmAN ETAL., THE ANATOMY
OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCrIONAL APPROACH (2004)).
54. See id.
55. Of course, the EC or an EC-like institution is just one possible form of
international cooperation. Other forms include bilateral agreements. For instance, treaties
exist requiring the recognition of American companies, e.g., between Germany and the
United States, Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, art. XXV, U.S.-ER.G., Oct.
29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, and between Italy and the United States, Treaty on Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, art. II, U.S.-Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255. On the effects of
these treaties, see BGH Jan. 29, 2003, 153 BGHZ 353 (F.R.G.) (recognizing a foreign
corporation's capacity and standing to sue in Germany). See also Jens C. Dammann,
Amerkanische Gesellschaften mit Sitz in Deutschland, 68 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr FUR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 607 (2004) (F.R.G.); Tito Ballarino, La
societi per azioni nella disciplina internazionalptivastica, in 9* TRATTATO DELLE SOCIETA
PER AZioNi 3, 93-94 (G.E. Colombo & G.B. Portale eds., 1994) (Italy). By contrast, the
equivalent Austrian Treaty explicitly requires that limited liability companies maintain a
central office within the territory of their incorporation. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Consular Rights, art. IX, U.S.-Austria, June 19, 1928, 47 Stat. 1876.
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companies' mobility and mutual recognition rather than impose
substantive mandatory rules on private parties.
1. Negative Harmonization
Negative harmonization on the basis of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (EC Treaty), which provides for freedom of
establishment in article 43, as implemented by the ECJ's case law,
imposes restraints on choice-denying techniques.56 The Centros-
Oberseering-Inspire Art triad requires Member States to recognize
foreign EU (and European Economic Area (EEA)) corporations' legal
capacity57 and allows restrictive measures only under very limited
circumstances." Any such measures "liable to hinder or make less
attractive the exercise" of the freedom of establishment need to satisfy
the criteria set out in Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli
Avvocat e Procuratori d Milano (Gebhard).59 That is, "they must be
applied in a nondiscriminatory manner; they must be justified by
imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable
for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and
they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it."
While Member States may take measures to prevent or penalize fraud
or abuse,6' broad-sweeping statutes generally imposing national
creditor-protection devices on pseudo-foreign corporations are thus
impermissible. Because those imperative requirements are apparently
56. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3
[hereinafter EC Treaty]; see Francesco Munari & Paolo Terrile, The Centros Case and the
Rise of an EC Market for Corporate Law, in CAPrrAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF THE EuRo:
CROss-BORDER TRANSACTIONS, LISTED COMPANIES AND REGULATION 529, 540-46 (Guido
Ferrarini, Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2002). For a general overview of
harmonization and regulatory competition under article 43, see EU LAW 457-67 (Josephine
Steiner et al. eds., 9th ed. 2006).
57. See, e.g., BGH Sept. 19, 2005, II ZR 372/03, 58 DER BETRIEB [DB] 2345 (2005)
(F.R.G.) (recognizing a Liechtenstein corporation's legal capacity in Germany, irrespective of
its real seat).
58. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459, 1-1496 to 98; Case C-208/00, Jberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, paras. 1-2 (holding of the court); Case C-167/01, Kamer
van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10,155,
paras. 1-2 (holding of the court).
59. Case C-55/94, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 1-4197.
60. Id. at 14197 to 98. As an example of the application of the Gebhard factors, see
Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1495; InspireAr4 2003 E.C.R. para. 133.
61. See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1496; InsphreArt; 2003 E.C.R. para. 136.
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narrowly construed, Member States are to a large degree forced to
allow for free choice among EU corporate laws.
The actual extent of Member States' discretion is still unclear and
possibly will remain so for a long time. What is worth highlighting
here is that to the extent that private international law rules have not
been harmonized, they are still an issue of national legislation. One
could conclude from this that only the result of the conflict-of-law
analysis in each particular case needs to be measured against the
requirements of primary EC law. 2  However, in Uberseering BV v
Nordic Construction Co. Baunanagement GmbH, the ECJ also held
that a corporation validly incorporated in the Netherlands is entitled
under articles 43 and 48 of the EU Treaty to exercise the freedom of
establishment in Germany as a corporation incorporated in the
Netherlands.63 As a result, Member States will have to recognize not
only the legal capacity of pseudo-foreign corporations, but also a
certain substantive core of the corporate law of the state of
incorporation, although it is not clear how far this core extends.'
Outside of it, the application of the law of the state of incorporation is
not imperative. Whether something is considered corporate or
insolvency law is largely an issue of the national conception of these
fields. Member States may even "relabel" rules as insolvency law if it
serves the purpose of being able to apply their own law under the
62. See Erich Schanze & Andreas Jiittner, Die Entscheidung fir Pluraliti't:
Kollisionsreht und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung 'Inspire Art, " 48 DIE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 661, 665 (2003) (ER.G.) (pointing out that articles 43 and 47 of
the Treaty on European Union do not intend to harmonize private international law); Peter
Ulmer, Gldubigerschutz bei Scheinauslandsgeselschaften, 57 NEUE JURsnscHE
WocHENscHRIFr [NJW] 1201, 1205 (2004) (ER.G.) (same).
63. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. para. 80.
64. The German Bundesgenichtshofrecently held that it follows from the recognition
of the legal personality of English companies that the liability of managers and shareholders
to corporate creditors is determined by the law of incorporation. BGH Mar. 14, 2005, II ZR
5/03, 60 Betriebs-Berater [BB] 1016 (2005) (F.R.G.). But see Gebhard Rehm, Vdlker- und
europarechtliche Voaben fir die Bestimmung des Gesellschaftsstatuts, in AUSLANDISCHE
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN IM DEUTSCHEN RECHT § 2 cmt. 70, at 39 (Horst Eidenmiiller ed.,
2004) [hereinafter AUSLANDISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN] (explaining that it would be
theoretically possible to recognize foreign corporations as such, but to apply certain German
law provisions to them). Under the most radical position in German literature, this core
shrinks to legal capacity, while German law still applies to all other issues, including the main
creditor-protection doctrines. See Holger Altmeppen & Jan Wilhelm, Gegen &e Hystenie um
die Niederlassungsfreiheit der Scheinauslandsgesellschaten, 57 DB 1083 (2004); Holger
Altmeppen, Schutz vor "europAischen" Kapitalgeselschaflen, 57 NJW 97 (2004); see also
Landgericht Kiel [LG Kiel] [Kiel Trial Court] Apr. 20, 2006, 10 S 44/05, 61 BB 1468 (2006)
(qualifying the duty to file for insolvency as corporate law and allowing a damages claim
against an English Ltd under German Law).
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applicable conflict-of-law rules, as long as the Gebhard criteria are not
violated.
We will briefly address the issue of conflicts of law again within
the context of the most important creditor-protection mechanisms later
in Part III.A and reflect upon "relabeling" strategies in Part V For now,
suffice it to say that Centros and its progeny have reshaped the EU
corporate law landscape possibly more than many national reforms in
the various Member States and certainly more than any EC positive
harmonization effort thus far.
2. Positive Harmonization
With positive harmonization, the EC imposes on Member States
an obligation to adopt certain rules (through directives) or directly
imposes such rules on EU (and EEA) citizens and firms (through
regulations).65 Positive harmonization can be substantive whenever it
defines the content of national corporate laws or it can be procedural
and relate to choice oflaw itself either by promoting or by reducing it.
Of course, individual harmonization measures may contain both
substantive harmonization rules and choice-of-law-related ones;
however, the distinction is useful in order to emphasize the kind of
impact harmonization can have on free choice.
Substantive harmonization measures can preempt States'
legislative powers to a varying degree." Total preemption occurs in the
case of maximum harmonization, while minimum harmonization
leaves greater room for States' intervention in the harmonized area."
When maximum harmonization measures are adopted, Member
States must adopt the rules devised and may not impose stricter or
additional rules." Here, the degree of uniformity achieved is the
highest, but the regulatory outcome, of course, is not necessarily the
most restrictive. If the harmonizing measures leave some room for
contractual freedom, the EC prevents Member States from further
65. See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BUJRCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2003).
66. See, e.g., CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIvE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR
FREEDOMS 508-20 (2004).
67. See id The same is also true in the case of optional harmonization. It can take
many forms, such as a choice between two mandatory rules that may be given to the Member
States or to private parties or to both, or the provision of default rules, or even the requirement
that States introduce a regime that private parties will be free to choose through an opt-in
decision. See id. at 515.
68. See id. at 508-20.
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restricting it. At the same time, the harmonized regime may turn out to
be excessively lenient; for example when the compromise-prone
outcome of the EC legislative process sets an excessively low level of
regulation and, for whatever reason, private parties are unable to bind
themselves effectively to a stricter regime by contract or are prevented
by the harmonizing measure itself to enter into such kind of
agreement. In any event, regulatory competition is banned whether it
would take, as is usually the case, the direction of a greater respect for
contractual freedom or the opposite one.
With minimum harmonization measures, the EC requires
Member States to impose at least the EC-devised rules, but Member
States retain the power to impose additional or stricter rules (so-called"goldplating").69 When minimum harmonization couples with mutual
recognition, the stricter national rules can only apply to domestic
firms. In the absence of mutual recognition, Member States may also
impose stricter rules on foreign firms' conduct that is, for whatever
reason, caught by national law.
As already hinted, substantive harmonization most often means
imposing some mandatory rules across the EU and the EEA, or, more
precisely, extending to all Member States rules that are already in place
in a majority of them and making them "more" mandatory. This
occurs for two reasons. First, there is no escape from the rules other
than by incorporating in, or otherwise choosing (if at all possible) a
non-EU, non-EEA jurisdiction. Second, repeal of the relevant
mandatory rule will be more difficult due to the well-known
phenomenon of petrification."
With substantive harmonization, Member States may still deviate
from the harmonized outcome, albeit in a disguised, undercover way.
Member States may, in fact, fail to properly implement the
harmonizing measure, or they may fail to enforce it, or, finally, their
judges and enforcers may construe the harmonized measures in line
with prior, more (or less) lenient national rules.' In other words,
Member States have various ways to cheat on the EC regulatory cartel.
69. See id.
70. See Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the
Business Enterprise, in 4 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 265 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds.,
1988).
71. Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Ae
They, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 12-17 (2006).
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Whenever the EC measures are not purely optional or do not
impose purely enabling rules on Member States, not only do they
introduce EU/EEA-wide mandatory rules that are more difficult to
escape from and to repeal, but they also have an impact on regulatory
competition. Their presence reduces the regulatory surplus businesses
can gain from (re)incorporation, thereby reducing the dynamism of the
market for corporate law rules.72
3. Choice-of-Law-Related Harmonization
Positive harmonization can also be more directly related to
choice-of-law issues. First, there are measures that aim to remove
barriers to freedom of establishment or increase EU companies' cross-
border mobility, thereby enhancing free choice of corporate law." The
most prominent example of a choice-enhancing set of rules thus far is
Parliament and Council Directive 2005/56/EC (Cross-Border Merger
Directive),74 which can work as a tool for reincorporations."
Second, we have measures that harmonize the procedure to be
followed in order to exercise choice of law, such as safeguards for
employees or creditors (so-called procedural harmonization).76
Whenever such measures attach to other measures requiring Member
States to introduce new tools for companies' mobility (as is usually the
case), depending on the "proportionality" of the safeguards, they can
be viewed either as what is needed in order to avoid opportunistic
reincorporations or as the political price to pay for greater choice. If
the measures attach to tools for companies' mobility that are already
existing and effective in a sufficient number of Member States, then
such measures may restrict rather than enhance free choice."
72. See STEFANO LOMBARDO, REGULATORY COMPETITION IN COMPANY LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PREREQUISITES AND LIMITS 193 (2002).
73. See, e.g., Parliament and Council Directive 2005/56/EC, Cross-Border Merger
Directive, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1 [hereinafter Cross-Border Merger Directive].
74. Id.
75. In the United States, reincorporations are typically made by merging the parent
corporation into a shell subsidiary set up in the reincorporation state. Cf Ronald J. Gilson,
Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L.
329, 355 & n.90 (2001).
76. Cf Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonization in European
Company Law, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 190, 211 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
77. For instance, suppose that most Member States already allowed for cross-border
mergers without requiring any involvement of employees in the process. If the EC requires
Member States to involve employees, as the Cross-Border Merger Directive does, then
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Finally, we have measures that directly address choice-of-law
issues by harmonizing conflict-of-law rules. Depending on the
connecting factor chosen for the solution of the conflict,
harmonization of this kind can either promote or restrict free choice.
In the former case, regulatory arbitrage is imposed from the top,
which, to be sure, is almost never the case with EC harmonization. In
the latter case, regulatory arbitrage is ruled out or at least restricted
within the EU
4. Prospective Harmonization
The presence of an actor like the EC, with its positive
harmonization powers, may have an impact on regulatory competition
and free choice no matter whether these powers are indeed exercised,
provided that private parties and policymakers at the State level know
that the EC may step in to react to any Member State's move to attract
(re)incorporations. In two recent articles, Mark Roe has argued that
the threat of federal intervention has shaped the development of U.S.
corporate law much more than interstate competition.78 This was done
by creating an incentive for Delaware decisionmakers not to overstep
certain boundaries beyond which corporate law would become
untenable to federal decisionmakers, who are subject to different kinds
of political pressures.79
Of course, it is theoretically conceivable that the mere prospect of
European harmonization influences decision making at the national
level." In quite a different sense than envisioned by Professor Roe,
bona fide legislators occasionally implement draft directives before
they are adopted. However, it is quite unlikely for a State to be
influenced in the way Roe describes. The European legislative process
is relatively slow (compared to the United States Congress) and rather
impervious to populist pressures, due to the absence of a common
European public sphere."1 The EU legislator has rarely, if ever, been
harmonization hinders companies' mobility. Cross-Border Merger Directive, supm note 73,
art. 14.
78. See Roe, Delaware Competition, supra note 3, at 591; Roe, Delaware ! Politics,
supra note 3, at 2494.
79. See Roe, Dela ware. Competition, supra note 3, at 591; Roe, Delaware Politics,
supra note 3, at 2494.
80. Cf Roe, Delaware f Competition, supra note 3, at 644.
81. See Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European
Corporate Law, 5 J. CoRP. L. STUD. 247, 278-79 (2005); see also Luca Enriques, BadApples,
Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms
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able to gain support from businesses to enact meaningful corporate
law." Generally, Delaware's responsiveness to the threat of federal
intervention is owed to its financial dependence on franchise revenue,
which creates a powerful incentive against implementing legal rules
that might put its unique position among states at risk.83 Hence, as
long as regulatory competition remains defensive and no European
"Delaware" arises, there is no jurisdiction upon which supranational
competition can exert significant pressure. The possibility of enacting
nontrivial law may even chill nondefensive regulatory competition.
One State's attempt to attract incorporations by creating significant
rents by means of corporate law could just trigger a reaction by other
States, which would push for harmonization."
5. Summary
We have shown that in a multijurisdictional setting, the degree to
which corporate law rules are mandatory depends on the degree of
freedom each jurisdiction grants to private actors. States can deny
their private parties' freedom of choice in corporate law, restrict it, or,
finally, defer to it, with a corresponding decrease in the mandatory
character of corporate law rules. This depends, of course, on how easy
it is de facto to exercise free choice.
In the EU, under the impulse of the ECJ, Member States can now
only restrict their citizens' free choice of corporate law within the
somewhat strict boundaries that the ECJ itself has drawn in its freedom
of establishment decisions." This implies a relaxation of the
mandatory character of corporate law rules both because at any given
time private parties may opt out of local mandatory rules by opting
into another State's corporate law and because, from a dynamic point
of view, States may have to decrease the level of creditor and investor
protection to retain corporations within their borders. Such
developments may be less dramatic than they appear, however, due to
38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 911, 914-15 (2003) (arguing there is rarely transnational demand to
create European-wide corporate law); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism
and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1583-90 (2005) (viewing
populist politics at the federal level as a serious threat to Delaware).
82. SeeEniques, supranote 71, at 51.
83. Roe, Delaware Competition, supra note 3, at 601-07, 644; see Roberta Romano,
The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDzO L. REv. 709, 721-22 (1987).
84. See Enriques, supra note 52, at 1269-70.
85. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
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existing or prospective positive harmonization measures at the EC
level, with regard to substantive law or conflict-of-law rules.
Ill. PREINSOLVENCY RULES AND REGULATORY COMPETITION N
CORPORATE LAW
We now proceed to investigate the potential for corporate law
arbitrage, forum shopping, and regulatory competition in European
corporate law with respect to creditor protection. Although we are
ready to concede that the distinction is not clear-cut, in this Part we
deal with preinsolvency rules. These are rules that operate before the
onset of insolvency or, to be more precise, become operational whether
the corporation goes bankrupt or not. Examples include minimum
asset requirements, limits to distributions, and creditors' rights to
safeguards in the event of specific transactions and disclosure. We
also discuss regulatory arbitrage and regulatory competition within the
EU and their implications for creditors. Then, in Part I, we turn to
postinsolvency rules, which operate only after a corporation has gone
bankrupt. Before proceeding, we would like to stress that our purpose
here is not to give a complete taxonomy of each and every creditor-
protection instrument currently in use across the EU, but to show what
room the current framework leaves for regulatory arbitrage and
regulatory competition in Europe.
A. An Overview of the Main Preinsolvency Rules from an
Intejutisd'ctonalPerspecdve
Generally, preinsolvency rules follow the law of incorporation,
which means that they factor into the calculus of choosing a particular
state of incorporation and that they have an influence on regulatory
competition in corporate law. There have been substantial efforts at
positive harmonization of these rules. However, these efforts have
borne little fruit thus far. First, many of these measures-in particular
Council Directive 77/91/EEC (Second Directive)-apply only to
public companies such as the Aktiengesellschal the naamloze
vennootschap, the soci6t6 anonyme, or the societper azioni but not to
private ones. 6 Second, those measures have altered national corporate
86. See Council Directive 77/91/EEC, Second Company Law Directive, art. 1, 1977
O.J. (L 26) 1 [hereinafter Second Directive]. The Second Directive sets requirements for the
formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their
capital, which Member States are required to transpose into their national laws. Id.
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law less than one might expect. EC directives relating to corporate law
generally leave a variety of options to Member States, where lawyers
have frequently understood European law within the context of their
respective national legal culture. Those provisions of secondary
European law that are mandatory are typically underenforced at the
European level, allowing either Member States or corporations to
circumvent them with relative ease.
Conflict-of-law rules on preinsolvency rules are generally
considered well-settled and thus usually considered part of corporate
law. Hence, before Centros, the applicable legal regime would depend
on either the real-seat theory or the incorporation theory.89 Member
States, especially the ones that were denying or restricting free choice
of corporate law, often provided for creditor-protection measures that
went far beyond the requirements of EC law. Starting with Centros,
negative harmonization by the ECJ has resulted in "defensive
regulatory competition" whereby some Member States have already
started to remove rules that were apparently the outcome of isolation
from competition."
1. Minimum Net Assets
The Second Directive requires public corporations to have a legal
capital of at least 625,000, which need not be entirely covered by
assets at the time of incorporation." With the Second Directive not
applying to private limited companies (Ltds), Member States have
87. See Enriques, supm note 71, at 12-14.
88. See id.
89. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459; cf William J. Carney, Introduction to Symposium, Business Law: The Impact of
Competition on Regulation, 52 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1288 n.20 (2003).
90. See Chertok, supra note 29, at 495-96.
91. Second Directive, supra note 86, arts. 6, 9. Additional initial-capital requirements
exist for credit institutions, Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC, art. 5, 2000 O.J. (L
126) 1 [hereinafter Directive 2000/12/EC] (relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions), and insurance companies, see STEFAN GRUNDMANN,
EUROPMISCHES GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT cmt. 140, at 67 (2004). Furthermore, credit
institutions are already required by European law to meet certain solvency requirements.
Directive 2000/12/EC, supra, arts. 40-50. A recently issued directive will implement the
Basel II accord, under which minimum asset requirements for investment firms and credit
institutions will depend on the risk of outstanding credit. See Parliament and Council
Directive 2006/49/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 201; see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEwoRK 24-170 (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs107.pdf.
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been able to choose freely the amount for this set of corporations. This
resulted in a broad variety of regulations, ranging from no such
requirement in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Cyprus to a
requirement of C35,000 in Austria.92 Centiros has already induced
France, effectively, to abolish minimum capital for private
corporations," and even the German Ministry of Justice proposed a
reduction from C25,000 to E10,000. 4
The effectiveness of minimum capital requirements in actually
protecting creditors are highly doubtful for reasons that need not be
reiterated here. 5 Even some supporters of legal capital requirements
concede that their function does not lie in protecting creditors from the
risk of substantial losses resulting from an unfavorable business
development, but rather in signaling seriousness to the market; thus,
this erects a barrier against the creation of dubious corporations with
an unreasonable amount of backing by shareholders.96 However, if
92. Gesetz fiber Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter Haftung [GmbHG] [Limited
Liability Company Act] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.] No. 58/1906, §§ 6(1), 10(1) (Austria); see
Carsten Frost, Transfer of Company Seat-An Unfolding Story in Europe, 36 VIcT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REv. 359, 372-73 (2005). To be sure, only E17,500 needs to be paid in cash
before the corporation is registered (or the lower total amount of cash contributions, which is
permissible if there are contributions in kind for which the consideration has to be transferred
in full). Limited Liability Company Act, suproa § 10(1).
93. Law No. 2003-721 of Aug. 1, 2003, Journal Officiel de la R publique Fran~ais
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France), Aug. 5, 2003, p. 13,449, art. 1; see Eva-Maria Kieninger,
The Legal Framework ofRegulatory Competition Based on Company Mobility EUand US
Compareg 6 GERMAN L.J. 741, 768 (2004).
94. For the most recent legislative draft, see Referentenentwurf: Entwurf eines
Gesetzes zur Modemisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekiimpfung von Missbrdiuchen
(MoMiG) art. 1(3) (2006), available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/media/archive/1236.pdf
[hereinafter MoMIG]. For a discussion of earlier proposals, see Massimo Miola, Legal
Capital and Limited Liability Companies: The European Perspectve, 2 EUR. COMPANY &
FIN. L. REv. 413, 445-46 (2005); Wolfgang Z611ner, Konkurrenz flir inlndische
Kapitalgesellschaften durch aasl&ndische Rechtstrager insbesondere durch die englische
Private Limited Company, 97 GMBH-RuNDscHAu [GMBHR] 1, 11 (2006).
95. See John Armour, Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a
Modem Company Law, 63 MOD. L. REv. 355, 371-72 (2000); Enriques & Macey, supra note
14, at 1185-88; Peter 0. Miilbert & Max Birke, Legal Capital-Is There a Case Against the
European Legal CapitalRules 3 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 695, 732 (2002).
96. See Marcus Lutter, Gesetzliches Garantiekapital als Problem europ4scher und
deutscher Rechtspolitik; 43 AG 375, 375 (1998); Hanno Merkt, Das Centros-Urteil des
Europiischen Gefichtshofs hn 2 GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT IN DER DisKussIoN 1999, at 111, 138
(Gesellschaftsrechtlichen Vereinigung ed., 2000); Friedrich Rfiffler, Gldubigerschutz durch
Mindestkapital und Kapitalerhaltung in der GmbH--iberholtes oder sinnvolles Konzept 2
GESELLSCHAFrs- UND STEUERRECHT AKTUELL [GES] 140, 146 (2005); Rdidiger Wilhelmi, Das
Mindestkapital als Mindestschutz-eine Apologie im Hinblick auf die Diskussion um eine
Reform der GmbHangesichts der englischen Limited 97 GMBHR 13, 13-14 (2006); see also
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there are any benefits to this argument, they need to be weighed
against the disadvantages of preventing the formation of potentially
thriving companies backed by a sound business idea but little or no
assets.
The Centros-Inspire Art line of decisions has made it impossible
for national legislators to impose minimum asset requirements on
pseudo-foreign corporations.97 Thus, the possibilities for corporate law
arbitrage in this field are nearly unrestricted.98 In fact, minimum
capital has become one of the most important factors driving the
incorporation of continental businesses in the United Kingdom. As
already seen, this has prompted some "defensive regulatory
competition" across the EU.99 It is fairly easy to predict that the final
outcome of this process will be the practical elimination of minimum
capital requirements.
2. Restrictions on Distributions
In the EU, legal rules limiting managers' discretion over the
declaration of dividends or any other way of conveying corporate
assets to shareholders are intertwined with the regulation of legal
capital."° Under article 15(1) of the Second Directive, no distributions
to shareholders may be made when net assets are lower or would
become lower than subscribed capital plus certain reserves which may
not be distributed, except in the case of a reduction of subscribed
capital.'"' Even if this does not protect creditors against regular
business risk, a public corporation will, in principle, be unable to
GRUNDMANN, supm note 91, cmt. 328; Wolfang Sch6n, The Future of Legal Capital, 5 EuR.
Bus. ORG. L. RE. 429,436-39 (2004).
97. See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10,155; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og
Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459.
98. See Ulrich Forsthoff & Martin Schulz, Gldubigerschutz bei EU-
Auslandsgesellschaften, in GRENZOBERSCHREITENDE GESELLSCHAFTEN § 15 cmt. 27
(Heribert Hirte & Thomas Bficker eds., 2005); Stefan Grundmann, Regulatory Competition
in European Company Law-Some Different Genius?, in CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF
THE EURO, supia note 56, at 561, 583-84.
99. See supra Part II.A.4.
100. Of course, this does not necessarily have to be the case because restrictions on
distributions may also be related to balance sheets in the absence of legal capital rules or not
be related at all with balance-sheet data, as when a solvency test is required. See MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (2002). Even the prohibition of concealed distributions, described
infia text accompanying notes 108-116, could conceivably apply in the absence of legal
capital.
101. Second Directive, supm note 86, art. 15(1).
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convey funds to shareholders if net assets fall below the subscribed
capital, unless shareholders vote to go through a capital-reduction
procedure which includes certain safeguards for creditors.' 2
Reduction below the minimum capital is of course ruled out entirely.13
As a remedy, article 16 of the Second Directive requires that
distributions received must be returned if the corporation proves that
these shareholders knew of the irregularity "or could not in view of the
circumstances have been unaware of it.''" 4
However, two important caveats need to be mentioned. First, the
actual computation of net assets within the meaning of the directive is
basically a balance-sheet test on the basis of the last financial year's
annual accounts. Thus, the extent of "capital maintenance" depends
on the applicable accounting rules. In spite of Council Directive
78/660/EEC (Fourth Directive), which on its face, harmonizes
accounting law in great detail,0 5 a considerable number of elective
provisions have allowed EU Member States to uphold their national
accounting cultures.'" However, the recent International Accounting
Standards (IAS) regulation gives Member States the choice between
an accounting system based on the Fourth Directive, or one on
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, formerly known as
IAS) for individual accounts. 7
102. Id. arts. 30-39.
103. Id. art. 34.
104. Id. art. 16.
105. Council Directive 78/660/EEC, Fourth Company Law Directive, 1978 O.J. (L
222) 11 [hereinafter Fourth Directive].
106. Eg., Werner F Ebke, Accounting, Auditing, and Global Capital Markets in
CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS, AND BusINEsS IN THE LAW: LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD
M. BUXBAUM 113, 119 (Theodor Baums et al. eds., 2000); Martin Gelter & Mathias M.
Siems, Recent Development, Judicial Federalism in the ECJ, "Berlusconi Case: TowardMore
Credible Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting?, 46 HARv INT'L L.J. 487, 505
(2005); see also Axel Hailer, International Accounting Harmonization: American Hegemony
or Mutual Recognition with Benchmarks? Comments andAdditonal Notes from a German
Perspective, 4 EuR. AccT. REv. 235, 237 (1995) ("The new accounting rules were interpreted
in the light of the existing German accounting model .... ).
107. Parliament and Council Regulation No. 1606/2002, art. 5(a), 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1.
Member States are also allowed to delegate this choice to firms. See Martin Gelter,
Kapitalerhaltung und internationale Rechnungslegung, 33 DER GESELLSCHAFrER 177, 179-85
(2004) (Austria) (showing the incompatibility between specific fundamental principles of
IFRS accounting and the Second Directive, as interpreted in German-speaking countries);
Wolfgang Sch6n, Geselschafler-, GlAubiger- nd Anlegerschutz im Europgschen
Bilanzrech 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 706,
720-21 (2000) (ER.G.) (arguing that a "dynamic interpretation" of European accounting
directives to conform to JAS would neglect the necessary regard for creditor protection);
Wolfgang Sch6n, Internationalisierung der Rechnungslegung und GlI'ubigerschutz, 54 DIE
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Second, as a practical matter, it is not entirely clear to what kind
of transactions the prohibition applies. While the Second Directive
explicitly speaks only of "distributions," German commentators
generally agree that so-called concealed distributions (verdeckte
AusschiMtungen or verdeckte Einageniickgewwh)' 8  are also
prohibited. °9 This term refers to transactions in which corporate funds
are conveyed to shareholders indirectly, typically through contracts
entered into on unfair terms, such as loans to shareholders with
unusually low (or no) interest rates or purchases from shareholders at
excessive prices. ' ° One argument in favor of such a doctrine uses
article 42 of the Second Directive, which requires equal treatment of
shareholders under equal conditions."' More importantly, if the
prohibition is to be effective, it does not matter whether a distribution
is made through the official declaration of dividends or in any other
way.'1 2 Naturally, the German understanding of the Second Directive is
shaped by the extensive German case law on concealed distributions to
shareholders, 3 which, among other things, covers issues such as
guarantees for a shareholder's personal debt by the corporation 14
However, because the Second Directive only applies to public
corporations, German law totally prohibits concealed distributions in
Aktiengesellschaten,"5 while in GmbHs concealed distributions are
WIRTSCHAFTSPROFUNG (SPECIAL IssuE) 74, 76 (2001) (F.R.G.) (arguing that IAS accounting
shifts risk from shareholders to creditors); see also Eilis Ferran, The Place for Creditor
Protection on theAgenda for Modernisation of Company Law in the European Union, 3 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REv. 178, 208-11 (2006) (discussing the question of compatibility
between the Second Directive and IFRS accounting).
108. See UWE HUFFER, AKTIENGESETZ § 57 (6th ed. 2004).
109. See GRUNDMANN, supra note 91, cmt. 343; MATHIAS HABERSACK, EuRoP IsCHEs
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT cmt. 167, at 123 (2d ed. 2003); GONTER CHRISTIAN SCHWARZ,
EuRoPAISCiHEs GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT cmt. 596, at 379-80 (2000); Peter 0. Miilbert,
Kapitalschutz und Gesellschailszweck bei der Aktiengesellschaft, in FESTSCHRIFr FUR
MARcus LUTrER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 535, 545-47 (Uwe H. Schneider et al. eds., 2000).
110. See Holger Fleischer, Disguised Distributions and Capital Maintenance in
European Company Law, in LEGAL CAPITAL IN EUROPE 94 (Marcus Lutter ed., 2006).
111. GRUNDMANN, supra note 91, cmt. 343.
112. See Fleischer, supra note 110, at 100 (arguing that the purpose of articles 15 and
16 implies a general prohibition of concealed distributions); Miilbert, supra note 109, at 546-
47 (same); Wolfgang Sch6n, Deutsches Konzempivileg und europ iischer Kapitalschutz-
ein Widerspruch in FESTSCHRIFT FOR BRUNO KROPFF: AKTIEN- UND BILANZRECHT 285, 294
(Karl-Heinz Forster et al. eds., 1997) (same).
113. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
114. SeeBGHNov.24,2003, 157BGHZ72.
115. German commentators typically argue that because article 15(1)(c) of the Second
Directive limits distributions to profits, distributions other than through dividends are
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permitted as long as they do not reduce net assets below the statutory
capital requirement."'
By contrast, under English law a distribution is normally defined
as a transfer of assets without consideration.'"7 Still, in a vein similar to
the German doctrine, English courts have held the following to be
unauthorized returns of capital: excessive remuneration of directors,"8
undervalued transfers of real property to another corporation owned by
the same parent,"9 and guarantees for other firms within the same
group.'20 However, transactions that are not a complete sham will not
be considered a "distribution" at all, 2' meaning that, other than under
German law, a subjective element is required to void a transaction.'2
The recent Company Law Reform allows distributions in kind as long
as there are sufficient profits available for distributions to cover the
difference between the asset's book value and the consideration
received, which would not be acceptable under German law.' 3 Given
prohibited. See, e.g., HABERSACK, supM note 109, cmt. 164, at 121; SCHWARZ, supra note
109, cmt. 596, at 379-80.
116. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt,
Teil I [BGB1. I] at 1089, as amended by Gesetz, Dec. 21, 2006, BGB1. I at 3332, art. 3, § 57,
tanslated in BusNEss TRANSACTIONS IN GERmANY app. 7-1 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2006);
GmbHG [Limited Liability Company Act], Apr. 20, 1892, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.] at 477,
as amended by Gesetz, Mar. 22, 2005, BGBI. I at 837, art. 12, § 30, translated in BusINEss
TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supr, app. 6-26; cf MARCUS LUTIER & PETER HOMMELHOFF,
GMBH-GESETZ: KOMMENTAR § 30 cmt. 3 (Walter Bayer et al. eds., 16th ed. 2004). By
contrast, under Austrian corporate law, which usually strongly resembles German law,
concealed distributions are generally illegal in both types of corporations. See AktG BGB1.
No. 98/1965, § 52 (Austria); GmbHG RGB1. No. 58/1906, § 82 (Austria); see also Fleischer,
supm note 110, at 105-06.
117. See Clydebank Football Club Ltd v. Steedman, 2002 S.L.T. 109 (Sess.) (Scot.);
Richard Morris, Dividends, in 1 PALMER'S COMPANY LAW paras. 9.701, .705 (Geoffrey Morse
et al. eds., 25th ed. 2002); John Armour, Avoidance of Tramsactions as a 'Fraud on Creditors'
at Commnon Law, in VULNERABLE TRANSACTIONS IN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY para. 7.38
(John Armour & Howard Bennett eds., 2003).
118. In reHalt Garage (1964) Ltd, [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016, 1042-45 (Ch.) (Eng.).
119. SeeAveling Barford Ltd v. Perion Ltd, [1989] B.C.L.C. 626 (Ch.) (Eng.); see also
M.J. Burke, ShareholderRatiication ofDirectorsActions, 140 NEW L.J. 240,241(1990).
120. See Barclays Bank plc v. British & Commonwealth Holdings plc, [1996] 1
B.C.L.C. 1, 9-10 (Ch.) (Eng.); cf PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 279-80 (7th ed. 2003); MICHAEL FORDE, COMPANY LAW para. 7-31,
at 291 (3d ed. 1999); Eva Micheler, Glfubigerschutz im englischen Gesellschaftsrechi 33
ZGR 324, 328-29 (2004).
121. Armour, supranote 117, para. 7.38.
122. See Fleischer, supra note 110, at 101-02. For a detailed comparison, see Thomas
Bachner, Creditor Protection in Private Companies-Anglo-German Perspectives after
Centros (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University) (on file with author)
(see especially chapter 3 on capital maintenance and unlawful distributions).
123. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 845 (U.K.).
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that the English case law on this subject is sparse, and, even more
importantly, commentators appear not to see a connection with the
Second Directive, it is obvious that the understanding of constraints on
distributions imposed by EC law differs considerably.2" On top of that,
concealed distributions do not appear to be much of an issue in some
other countries."'
Because restrictions on distributions, including concealed
distributions, may result in significant cost (e.g., when planning
intragroup transactions to avoid violations of such rules) and
considerable risk to shareholders if the corporation goes bankrupt,
differences in the law may affect corporate arbitrage decisions to some
degree.'26 Following Centros and Inspire Ar4 there appears to be
widespread agreement that capital-maintenance rules of the state of
incorporation apply, and choice of law with respect to distributions will
therefore be possible.2 '
124. For example, Vanessa Edwards discusses neither the English nor the German
cases in her treatise. Se VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAw 69 (1999). The Rickford
report discusses the issue only briefly within the context of German law. See Jonathan
Rickford, Reforming CapitaL An lnoductory Note, 15 EuR. Bus. L. REv. 919, 1008 (2004).
125. For France, see MICHEL GERMAIN, 1:2 TRAITE DE DROrrCOMMERCIAL 607-09 (G.
Ripert & R. Roblot eds., 18th ed. 2002) (discussing the issue of "dividends fictifs" under
French Law and ignoring the issue of concealed distributions); see also Fleischer, supm note
110, at 102-04. For Spain, see Jos6 Massaguer Fuentes, Utli, Riserve e Dividend, in 2
ARMONIE E DISARMONIE NEL DIRITTO COMUNITARIO DELLE SOCIETA DI CAPITALI 1115, 1129-32
(Gian Franco Campobasso ed., 2003) (similar to France, but for Spanish law). For Italy, a
distinction has to be made between concealed distributions and concealed restitutions of
contributions. The former does not appear to be an issue. See, e.g., Giovanni E. Colombo, I]
bilancio d'esercizio, in 7* TRATrATO DELLE SOCIETA PER AZIONI, supm note 55, at 23, 535-44
(providing a thorough analysis of the Italian provision, Royal Decree, No. 262 of mar. 16,
1942 art. 2433, para. 4, Gazz. Uff., apr. 4, 1942, No. 79, which corresponds to article 16 of
the Second Directive, and discussing the relationships between the two, but totally ignoring
the problem of concealed distributions). To be sure, until 2002, it was a crime to distribute
"in any form" fictitious profits, and the relevant provision was construed as including the
case of concealed distributions. C.c. art. 2621. After the 2002 reform, however, the criminal
provision was reformulated without the "in any form" clause and, in the absence of case law
so far, it is widely construed as not including concealed distributions any more. See, e.g.,
Valerio Napoleoni, Le disposizioni penali in matenia &i societh e di consorz4 in CODICE
COMMENTATO DELLE NUOVE SOClETA 1690, 1773 (G. Bonfante et al. eds., 2004). There is,
however, some scholarly debate, and a couple of court decisions can be found with regard to
concealed restitutions of contributions, a phenomenon partially overlapping with concealed
distributions. See, e.g., Marco S. Spolidoro, Iconfeimentiin danaro, in 1 ** TRATATO DELLE
SOciETA PER AZIONi, supra note 55, at 247, 349-61 (2004) (not referencing, however, EC law).
126. Cf Miilbert & Birke, supra note 95, at 720-21 (conceding that creditors may look
favorably at rules against concealed distributions that, however, come at a significant cost).
127. E.g., Forsthoff & Schulz, supra note 98, cmt. 32. Contra Altmeppen, supra note
64, at 97, 102.
606
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3. Creditors' Right to Safeguards in the Event of Significant
Transactions
Jurisdictions sometimes protect creditors by granting them a right
to obtain some form of safeguard in the event the corporate debtor
executes a transaction supposedly capable of increasing the risk faced
by the creditor. This tool has also been used by EC corporate law with
regard to a few transactions, reflecting the fact that some Member
States already provided for similar safeguards prior to
harmonization.'28
First of all, the Second Directive provides that in the event of a
reduction of capital,
[a]t least the creditors whose claims antedate the publication of the
decision to make the reduction shall be entitled at least to have the right
to obtain security for claims which have not fallen due by the date of
that publication. The laws of a Member State shall lay down the
conditions for the exercise of this right.' 29
Further, such laws "may not set aside such right unless the creditor has
adequate safeguards, or unless the latter are not necessary in view of
the assets of the company."'30
Second, "an adequate system of protection" for the interests of
creditors has to be devised by Member States in the case of mergers
and divisions falling under Council Directive 78/855/EEC (Third
Directive) and Council Directive 82/891/EEC (Sixth Directive).'3'
Such provisions also apply to the formation of a European company by
merger'32 and to cross-border mergers.'33 In many Member States, the
system of protection is very similar to the one designed in article 32 of
the Second Directive for reductions of capital.''
128. For instance, in Italy, provisions similar to those on reduction of capital were
already present in the 1942 version of the Civil Code. C.c. arts. 2445, 2503 (relating to
reductions of capital and mergers respectively). For Germany, see AktG, Sept. 6, 1965,
BGBI. I at 1089, §§ 225, 347.
129. Second Directive, supra note 86, art. 32.
130. Id
131. See Council Directive 78/855/EEC, Third Company Law Directive, art. 13, 1978
O.J. (L 295) 36 [hereinafter Third Directive]; Council Directive 82/891/EEC, art. 12, 1982
O.J. (L 378) 47.
132. Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 24, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC).
133. Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 73, art. 2, para. 2.
134. Compare CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L236-14 (Fr.); Umwandlungsgesetz
[UmwG], Oct. 28, 1994, BGB1. I at 3210, as amended, Gesetz, Nov. 10, 2006, BGB1. I at
2553, art. 8, § 22 (F.R.G.); C.C. art. 2503 (Italy); CODIGO DAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIAIS arts.
101-A, 101-B, Decreto No. 76-A/2006 de 29 de marzo de 2006 (Port.); andart. 243 of the
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In general, the relevance of such provisions for creditor-
protection purposes can hardly be underestimated. To begin with, as
one of the authors has argued elsewhere, all such provisions are either
timidly market-mimicking or unimportant.' These provisions are
timidly market-mimicking "with regard to sophisticated creditors, who
normally reserve the far more effective right to veto such transactions
(usually in broader and more detailed terms) or insert an acceleration
clause applying if these transactions are entered into."'36 They are
unimportant with regard to other (voluntary) creditors,' 7 either because
these are weak creditors and, hence, lack the negotiating power to
exercise their right vis-A-vis the corporation or because they have such
power, in which case they do not need a right to obtain safeguards.'38
Further, with specific regard to the EC measures, the Third and
the Sixth Directives altogether are arguably trivial as long as at least
one Member State, namely the United Kingdom, lets its companies
execute mergers and divisions under a different set of rules."'
4. Mandatory Disclosure
One of the most important elements, or possibly the dominant
element, of EC corporate law is its extensive regime of disclosure.'4
Council Directive 68/151/EEC (First Directive) provides for the
Ley de Sociedades An6nimas [L.S.A.] [Law on Public Corporations] (Repertorio Aranzadi
Cronol6gico [R.C.L.] 1989, 1564) (Spain), with Second Directive, supra note 86, art. 32.
135. SeeEnriques, supmnote 71, at 33-34.
136. Id. at 34.
137. Creditor-safeguard provisions may matter to involuntary creditors, provided that a
number of conditions apply. First, involuntary creditors should have no other meaningful
relationship with the corporation. Second, legal systems should provide for effective ways for
them to become informed about the relevant transaction so as to be able to exercise their right
in a timely fashion. Finally, the exercise of such a right must be cheap compared with the
expected loss stemming from the increased risk of default following the transaction. In
countries where creditors need to act in court in order to obtain the relevant safeguard (as is
the case in Italy), and where no means exists to coordinate the efforts of the numerous
creditors that, for example, are the victims of a mass tort, the cost of exercising the right is
likely to be too high most of the time. See Carlo Santagata, Le fusiorn in 7** TRArrATo
DELLE SOCIETA PERAZIONI, supra note 55, at 3, 527 (2004).
138. Enriques, supra note 71, at 35-36. "[S]uch provisions do not require that the
company obtain creditors' consent to execute certain transactions. They require creditors to
activate in order to obtain protection, thus making it less plausible that a bargaining problem
connected with an endowment effect will arise." Id. at 36 n.145.
139. Seeid.at33.
140. Cf Stefan Grundmann, The Structure of European Company Law. From Crsis
to Boom, 5 Eut. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 601, 617 (2004) ("Information rules dominate European
company law....").
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disclosure of a variety of corporate data, but mostly for disclosure of
data about the corporation's annual accounts and consolidated
accounts."' The preambles to both the Fourth Directive and Council
Directive 83/349/EEC (Seventh Directive) refer to the interests of third
parties (obviously including creditors) to justify mandatory disclosure
of accounting information.' Mandatory disclosure is of particular
significance for small creditors who lack the bargaining power to force
the voluntary provision of information and who may even be
nonadjusting creditors who are not in the position to alter contract
terms depending on risk of default.
However, there are good reasons to doubt whether the
enforcement mechanisms of EC law for mandatory disclosure
provisions are effective. In 1997 and 1998, the ECJ ruled that
Germany had failed to adequately enforce disclosure requirements for
small companies.' 3 The ruling sparked a German reform act imposing
a new regime of sanctions.'" Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence
shows that more than ninety percent of German firms still fail to
comply,'45 although the newly enacted law on the electronic
commercial register may increase the effectiveness of enforcement.'46
A related issue, recently tackled by the ECJ in the Berlusconi
case, is accounting fraud.' 7 Even though there are no explicit
provisions addressing the issue in the company law directives,
Advocate General (AG) Juliane Kokott sweepingly suggested that
community law requires Member States to impose effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive penalties.'48 Further, AG Kokott argued
that false disclosure is at least as harmful as nondisclosure which is
141. See Council Directive 68/151/EEC, First Company Law Directive, art. 2, 1968
O.J. (L 65) 8.
142. See Fourth Directive, supra note 105, pmbl.; Council Directive 83/349/EEC,
Seventh Company Law Directive, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1.
143. See Case C-97/96, Verband deutscher Daihatsu-Hdindler eV v. Daihatsu
Deutschland GmbH, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6843, 1-6865, 1-6867; Case C-191/95, Commission v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 1998 E.C.R. 1-5449,1-5505.
144. Kapitalgesellschaften- und Co-Richtlinie-Gesetz [KapCoRiLiG], Feb. 24, 2000,
BGBI. I at 154 (F.R.G.) (introducing, among other things, penalties imposed upon request by
a shareholder, creditor, or the works council).
145. Franz Jirgen Marx & Holger Dallmann, Jahresabschlusspubli'it
mittelstgndischer Unternehmen 59 BB 929 (2004).
146. Gesetz iiber elektronische Handelsregister und Genossenschaftsregister sowie das
Untemehmensregister [EHUG], Nov. 10, 2006, BGB1. I at 2553, art. 1 (ER.G.).
147. Joined Cases C-387, C-391 & C-403/02, Berlusconi, 2005 E.C.R. 1-3565.
148. Seeid. paras. 67-81 (opinion ofAG Kokott).
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covered by the directives.'49 The ECJ agreed with this assessment in
principle, but decided in favor of the defendants on the basis of a rather
formalistic understanding of the nullapoena sine lege principle, which
forms an integral part of community law.'5° Still, European law could,
in theory, have an impact on the interests of creditors in that it ensures
the accuracy of financial statements.
However, various factors compromise the actual usefulness of
disclosure to creditors. Besides the issue of differences in applicable
accounting standards'5 and the lack of enforcement of disclosure in
some Member States, it is important to note the directives' failure to
provide a specific period after the end of the fiscal year within which
disclosure must occur. Member States sometimes prescribe relatively
generous filing periods. Examples include: nine months in the United
Kingdom for Ltds,"2 twelve months in Germany,'53 nine months in
Austria,"' and seven months in Italy and Spain.' At that point,
accounting information is, of course, already rather stale.
Thus, at least for small corporations, the European regime of
mandatory disclosure may bring fewer benefits than it appears at first
glance. Most of the justifications for mandatory disclosure commonly
advanced in the literature, which relate to the character of information
as a public good and its underproduction and mispricing in an
unregulated market, are understandable only within the context of
publicly traded firms. 6 For important creditors, such as banks,
information provided by mandatory disclosure under the regime of the
directives is of little significance because creditors are usually able to
gain access directly through the firm's managers.' 7 Trade creditors
will often not have the bargaining power to make similar requests.
Therefore, they resort to others ways of obtaining information about
149. See id. For an analysis of that opinion, see Gelter & Siems, supa note 106,
passim.
150. See Berlusconi 2005 E.C.R. paras. 63, 66-69 (court opinion).
151. See supm Part III.A.2.
152. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 442(2)(a) (U.K.).
153. Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] [Commercial Code], May 10, 1897, RGBI. 219, as
amended, § 325(1) (ER.G.).
154. Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] [Commercial Code], Mar. 1, 1939, Gesetzblatt ftir das
Land Osterreich [GblO] No. 83/1939, as amended, § 277(1) (Austria).
155. For Italy, see C.C. art. 2435 in connection with C.c. art. 2365(2). For Spain, see
articles 95, 171, and 218 of the L.S.A. (R.C.L. 1989, 1564).
156. For a succinct overview, see Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman & Edward Rock,
Issuers and investorProtection, nKRAAKmAN ET AL., supm note 53, at 194,204-07.
157. See ULRICH NOACK, UNTERNEHMENSPUBLIZITAT cmt. 104, at 40 (2002).
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the firm, or they will take out bad-debt insurance, while mandatory
disclosure is of little (if any) relevance to them.' The mandatory
disclosure regime imposed by the directives may, in effect, be doing as
little as ensuring the implementation of unitary accounting systems
and standards within the respective country.
Still, accounting and disclosure provisions are a factor potentially
influencing regulatory competition. From the perspective of conflict-
of-law rules, most authors seem to agree that accounting duties follow
corporate law."9  For example, an English Ltd should follow U.K.
accounting rules. Quite obviously, the ECJ would hardly tolerate a
Member State applying its own accounting law to foreign companies,
given extensive European harmonization."0 This view is confirmed by
the new audit directive, which implements the principle of home-
country regulation.'' The doctrine identifies as the applicable law the
one of the Member State in which the auditor is approved and in which
the audited entity has its registered office.'62
However, accounting is probably one of the few areas (the only
one?) where the founders of a corporation will usually not want to opt
out of their home state's corporate law regime. This is because
drawing up financial statements under a familiar system is easier and
less costly and because the home system will be harmonized with the
applicable tax law. Apparently, because the Companies House does
not investigate the substantive content of financial statements, it has
become common practice for English Ltds with their seat of
administration in Germany to submit accounts set up under the
accounting provisions of the German commercial code.'63
158. But see id (claiming without reference that in the United Kingdom disclosed
accounts are frequently inspected before a company enters into large business transactions).
159. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, Rechnungslegungspllicht der englischen limited mit Siz
in (sterreich, 23 OSTERREICHSCHES RECHT DER WIRTscHA r 134, 134-35 (2005) (Austria);
Bodo Riegger, Centros-lberseenng-Inspire Art: Folgen fur die Praxis, 33 ZGR 510, 515-
17 (2004); Andr6 0. Westhoff, Rechnungslegung, in GRENZOBERSCHRErENDE
GESELLSCHAFrEN, supra note 98, § 17 cmts. 31-34.
160. See Gelter, supra note 159, at 135; Markus Rehberg, Zivil-, Handels- und
Verfahrensrecht in AuSLANDISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFrTEN, supra note 64, § 5 cmt. 114, at
165.
161. Parliament and Council Directive 2006/43/EC, art. 34(1), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 87.
162. See id. On damages claims against the auditor, see Werner E Ebke, § 323 HGB,
in 4 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM HANDELSGESETZBUCH cmts. 148-168 (Karsten Schmidt
ed., 2001).
163. Westhoff, supranote 159, cmt. 111.
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For large listed firms, JFRS/IAS has become the accounting
system of choice with the EC "IAS Regulation.""' However, the
debate on accounting provisions for small firms is far from over.
Accounting standards may, therefore, be one of the factors affecting a
corporate law arbitrage decision.
B. Corpomte LawArbiage andRegulatory Competition
We have seen that the ECJ has largely opened the field to
corporate law arbitrage. While there have been efforts at positive
harmonization, mostly concerning public corporations, they have
remained largely ineffective and therefore do not significantly curb
regulatory arbitrage.'65 As described above, preinsolvency rules are
mostly the domain of corporate law, much more so than in the United
States where creditor protection is not really an issue for corporate
legislators--except for restrictions on dividends, which are mostly
meaningless and prone to circumvention. '66 By contrast, in Europe,
creditor protection has long been a concern of corporate law. Hence, it
comes as no big surprise that the American discussion on regulatory
competition has little to offer on concerns of creditor protection.'67
We now proceed to assess the intensity of regulatory competition
within the EU today and how it is to be interpreted. Then we analyze
how ex ante and ex post choice-of-law decisions affect creditors. By
ex ante and expost decisions we mean the decision to incorporate or to
reincorporate before or after credit has been extended to the firm.
164. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
165. However, the risk that the EC may harmonize a given corporate law issue, making
the law of a Member State particularly attractive, may hinder regulatory arbitrage if
companies perceive that there is a high chance that a sufficient number of (re)incorporations
in that Member State will prompt harmonization, thereby making the choice of that corporate
law unattractive expost. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
166. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 618 (1986) (describing the
possibility of increasing surplus by reevaluating assets or changing accounting policies);
BAYLESS MANNING wiTH JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 93 (3d ed. 1990) ("Whether
one views it as a blessing or a deficiency of the existing statutory systems, it is at least a fact
that the corporation acts do not pursue the implementation of their own scheme with any real
seriousness."). The elimination or vestigialization of legal-capital rules has arguably been the
outcome of regulatory competition. Richard A. Booth, Capital Requirements in United
States Corporation Law, in LEGAL CAPITAL IN EUROPE, supra note 110, at 620, 622, reports
that "many observers have suggested that the dilution of substantive rules such as those
relating to legal capital may be attributable to destructive competition" among States and
suggests that, to the contrary, "it may also be the case that such rules proved to be inefficient
and that other more efficient rules have evolved."
167. The only exception seems to be Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1489-90 (discussing
involuntary creditors).
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1. Corporate Law Arbitrage and Regulatory Competition So Far
We have seen some regulatory arbitrage with respect to
preinsolvency rules is already happening, driven mostly by minimum
capital requirements and that possibly can, at least partly, be credited
for a trend toward the abolition of minimum capital requirements in
some countries.' 8 Still, it would probably be premature to infer any
long-term trends from this. Of course, legal capital requirements are
usually seen as an instrument of creditor protection. However, if
minimum capital requirements do not actually help creditors and
rational creditors should not care about them, then the changes in the
law induced by corporate law arbitrage so far are not really an issue of
creditor protection, but rather a removal of administrative slack
affecting only the interests of the founders of new companies. If it is
true that only one interest group is affected, and this group is affected
in a positive way, it seems hard to doubt that the effect of regulatory
competition is beneficial as well. Given the minor relevance of this
issue from the perspective of creditors, however, this recent
development should not be construed as evidence of either a "race to
the top" or a "race to the bottom" with respect to creditor protection.
2. ExAnte Choice of Law
Even in light of doubts about whether each of the current
creditor-protection mechanisms implemented by the Member States
actually serves the interests of creditors, it is hard to rule out entirely
that some of them serve these interests. Conceivably, Member States
could also devise new mechanisms that do. Hence, we ask whether
regulatory competition is likely to lead to the retention and
development of mechanisms creditors actually care about, i.e., whether
corporate law arbitrage will be beneficial.
Corporate debtors, especially when the corporation approaches
insolvency, have powerful incentives to act in ways that are detrimental
to creditors. This incentive arises because shareholders capture most
of the potential gains of increased risk, whereas creditors, whose entire
benefits are limited to the amount of principal plus interest stipulated
ex ante, have to bear most of the risk of failure.' 9 To counter this
168. SeeMiola, supra note 94, at 441-47.
169. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON.
147, 147-49, 160 (1977).
HeinOnline  -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 613 2006-2007
TULANE LA WREVIEW
danger, creditors frequently request contractual clauses limiting the
opportunism of debtors'7 ° or charge a risk-adjusted interest rate.'71
Hence, in line with the standard corporate law-and-economics
literature, which considers corporate law to be a standard-form
contract, the applicable regime of corporate law also needs to be seen
as part of the contract of lending.' 72  At least some corporate law
creditor-protection tools will affect the creditor's assessment of
shareholder and manager opportunism; to the extent that corporate law
reduces this risk, the creditor will charge a lower interest rate or find it
unnecessary to add protective covenants to the lending agreement. For
example, a rational creditor will take the possibility of veil piercing or
equitable subordination into account and adjust the interest rate
accordingly, considering the reduced risk, even if only marginally.
Similarly, creditors should make some adjustment depending on the
ability of managers and shareholders to remove assets from the
corporation, thus increasing the likelihood of insolvency and reducing
the chances of recovery (called asset diversion). It follows that rules
impeding such transactions, including concealed-distribution doctrines
or mandatory disclosure rules, should also affect creditors' decision on
the margin. Thus, assuming the ability to accurately assess risk of
default and to adjust prices and conditions accordingly, creditors
should be getting precisely what they bargained for in terms of ex ante
expectations.
A creditor may want a corporate debtor to observe a specific
Member State's creditor-protection regime. A powerful institutional
lender could theoretically even have the bargaining power to induce a
firm to submit itself to a particular regime.' 73  From this discussion,
considering firms' ex ante incorporation choice, both debtors and
170. See Clifford W Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FiN.
ECON. 117, 152-54 (1979).
171. See LOMBARDO, supra note 72, at 166 (discussing rational behavior by creditors
who reward incorporation in a Member State that has good law).
172. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contrac4 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1444-45 (1989).
173. As described above in Part II.A.3, an adjusting lender could select a given
corporate law by asking the borrower to set up a subsidiary in the desired legal system in
which the loan is given, and the subsidiary would then enter into a nonreincorporation
covenant, while the parent guarantees the loan. However, this will work only if the subsidiary
is endowed with a sufficient amount of assets to repay the loan; otherwise, the lender will
have to call upon the guarantee, in which case the corporate law governing the parent
corporation will be of primary importance again.
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lenders should have an incentive to lobby states to implement creditor-
protection rules which are beneficial to lenders (and borrowers).
However, the analysis so far ignores nonadjusting and partially
adjusting creditors. Most of all, tort claimants will not be able to
adjust their claims. Small, less sophisticated creditors (e.g., suppliers)
will be unable to determine exactly the risk involved and will find it
too costly to draft an agreement precisely reflecting the risk of the
borrower."' It is for these creditors that a boilerplate-contract
corporate law will be insufficient. Hence, in the presence of
nonadjusting creditors, a "race to the bottom" is theoretically possible,
because those creditors will not adequately react to the choice of a
suboptimal corporate law.'75
An obvious objection is that nonadjusting creditors may free ride
on the bargaining power of large lenders. Within certain limits, this is
likely to happen, namely in those cases where the law of a specific
jurisdiction is beneficial to creditors as a group. However, free riding
will not work if the choice of law involves a conflict of interest
between different groups of lenders, e.g., where bank loans are
collateralized, while trade creditors do not possess such protection.
Choice-of-law opportunities may therefore be detrimental to
nonadjusting creditors (in particular, tort creditors) vis-A-vis adjusting
creditors.'76
3. Ex Post Reincorporation
So far, only newly founded companies have taken advantage of
corporate law arbitrage within the EU. Once a specific regime has
been chosen, firms are locked into a particular system of creditor
protection. This is due mostly to the costs of moving: firms may need
to resort to complicated constructions in order to switch to a new
174. See genemlly Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 15, at 857, 864-65; Horst
Eidenmiiller, Beschdnkungen der Niederlassungsfreiheit und imre Rechtfertigung, in
AUSLANDISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 64, § 3 cmts. 39-40, at 60.
175. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1489-90.
176. SeeGelter, supmnote 81, at 276.
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regime.' Furthermore, they face severe obstacles resulting from
taxation.'
The first problem has been alleviated, at least to some degree, by
the recently enacted Cross-Border Merger Directive and the ECJ's
recent opinion in In re SEVIC Systems AG.'79 In SEVIC, the ECJ
found that the German law's failure to allow for cross-border mergers
violates articles 43 and 48 of the EU Treaty.' The second issue should
have been partly resolved by Council Directive 90/434/EEC (Directive
on the Taxation of Mergers), which prohibits the taxation of hidden
reserves in cross-border mergers subject to certain conditions.'8'
However, presently it remains unclear whether other types of
reincorporation will be possible without resulting in deterrent tax
consequences. Where reincorporation entails a change in the firm's
tax residence, which will not necessarily be the case if no assets are
relocated, it will often trigger exit taxation of unrealized gains. In
Lasteyrie du Saillant v Mimst le de L'Economie, des Finances et de
l'Industrie, the ECJ found that this was not permissible under the
freedom of establishment when a natural person moved to another
Member State. 2 There are good reasons to believe that this reasoning
also applies when a corporation reincorporates or moves to another
177. Consider, e.g., the Daimler-Chrysler merger, involving a German and an
American corporation. See Theodor Baums, Corporate Contracting Around Defective
Regulations The Daimler-Chrysler Case, 155 J. INSTITUTONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 119,
122-23 (1999).
178. See, e.g., Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury (Exparte Daily Ma), 1988
E.C.R. 5483.
179. See Case C-411/03, SEVIC Sys. AG, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10805; Cross-Border Merger
Directive, supra note 73.
180. See SEVIC Sys. AG, 2005 E.C.R. para. 31; see also Treaty of Amsterdam
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 arts. 43, 48.
181. See Council Directive 90/434/EEC, Directive on the Taxation of Mergers, art.
4(1), 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1, 20 [hereinafter Directive on the Taxation of Mergers]. But see
INT'L BuREAu OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SURVEY ON THE SOCIETAS EUROPAEA 78 (2003),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/resources/documents/survey.pdf (reporting,
on the basis of a questionnaire conducted in the then-fifteen Member States, that the
Directive on the Taxation of Mergers "still needs (partial) implementation in several Member
States"); Edward B. Rock, Taxes and Charter Competition 19-21 (2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) (describing the limited scope of tax exemptions under the
Directive on the Taxation of Mergers). In the United States, reincorporation in another state
is normally considered a reorganization not giving rise to taxation. I.R.C. § 368(a) (2000); cf
Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on ncorporation Choice.
Evidence on the 'Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1795,
1802 (2002). On tax impediments in Europe, see Tr6ger, supra note 52, at 16-18.
182. See Case C-9/02, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2409 para. 69.
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Member State, although it remains to be seen where exactly the ECJ
will draw the line.'83
Midstream or ex post corporate law arbitrage (i.e., during the
later life of the corporation) adds another dimension to the analysis.
Once firms are no longer locked into a particular legal regime, it may
be in the interest of both parties to commit ex ante to stay in a
particular legal system to which creditors have adjusted. In this case,
contractual creditors need to deal only with the law of one jurisdiction
and should be able to adjust and penalize bad law with relative ease,
assuming there are no information asymmetries about the content of
the particular law. The possibility of implicitly altering the terms of the
lending agreement by reincorporating compares to the U.S. debate on
mandatory rules in corporate law, which focuses on the relation
between shareholders and managers. The usual justification given for
making some rules mandatory in the midstream stage is managerial
opportunism."a Even if the charter terms were fair when the
corporation first went public, the argument goes, management can
push through charter amendments which are not necessarily in
shareholders' interest because shareholders are rationally ignorant and
subject to collective-action problems and because charter amendments
need to be proposed by the board of directors in the United States.'
This precludes charter amendments that will benefit shareholders but
183. See, e.g., Jens Kleinert & Peter Probst, Endgiiltiges Aus llk steuerliche
Wegzugsbeschrinkungen bei natrlichen undjunstischen Personen, 57 DB 673, 674 (2004);
Tr6ger, supra note 52, at 17. Contra wolfgang Sch6n, Playing Different Games? Regulatory
Competition in Tax and Company Law Compared, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 331, 359-60
(2005) (highlighting the implications of broad sweeping a holding like the one in Lasteyie du
Saillant for corporations); Rock, supra note 181, at 21-25 (similarly doubting that, unless
corporate income tax is federalized, Member States would accept that corporations can
reincorporate without paying taxes on hidden reserves). But see Gilbert Parleani, Relocation
and Taxation. The European Court ofJustice Disallows the French Rule ofDirect Taxation of
Unrealised Gains, 1 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 379, 381 (2004) (waiting for a legislative
solution). In particular, in the case of mere reincorporation without a relocation of assets, it
seems hard to conceive how a taxation of reserves could be justified in light of the EC case
law, as the ability to tax those reserves later will not be lost. See Andreas Engert, Steuerrech4
in AUSLANDISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFrEN, supra note 64, § 8 cmt. 111 (arguing that
German exit taxation should not apply in such cases in light of European law); Franz
Wassermeyer, Steuerliche Konsequenzen aus dem EuGH-Urteil "Hughes de Lasteyrie du
Safflant, "95 GMBHR 613, 615-16 (2004) (same); see also Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer
plc v. Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837 paras. 27-59 (applying a test of proportionality to the
question of whether a Member State may permit the offsetting of profits made by a
subsidiary in the same State while prohibiting the offsetting of profits made elsewhere).
184. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:
The Desirable Constraints on CharterAmendment, 102 HARV. L. RE. 1820, 1835-47 (1989).
185. Seeid
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be to the detriment of management. ' Therefore, it may be beneficial
if company managers' hands were tied with respect to charter
amendments.'87
Similarly, it may be beneficial if a firm is committed to the terms
of a lending agreement, as implied by the corporate law regime of its
state of incorporation. However, if the debtor is not committed to a
particular system, or if such a commitment is impossible or
prohibitively costly, the opportunity to move to a less creditor-friendly
jurisdiction creates a new moral-hazard problem vis-A-vis creditors.'
Under the regime created by recent ECJ case law, shareholders may
unilaterally decide to change the firm's charter or to reincorporate in
another jurisdiction without creditors' approval.'89 This moral-hazard
opportunity raises information costs for creditors who need to deal
with the laws of the multiple states in which a corporation might
reincorporate.
With time, sophisticated creditors would probably learn how to
deal with this and, at the very least, adjust interest rates accordingly.
Conceivably, a lending contract or a bond covenant could require the
debtor to stay within one particular legal system. In most cases,
creditors theoretically will be in the position to protect themselves
against this particular type of moral hazard. Even today, loan
agreements with banks often stipulate the acceleration of the loan in
the case of significant transactions, such as mergers. Similarly,
contracts might penalize reincorporations by raising interest rates in
186. Seeid
187. See Jeffirey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1549, 1573-85 (1989).
188. SeeLOMBARDO, supmnote 72, at 181-82.
189. To be sure, the ECJ's opinion in Case 81/87, The Queen v H.M Treasury(Ex
Parte Daily Maio, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, allows Member States to impose an export ban on the
firms incorporated under their respective law, is frequently still considered good law. See,
e.g., Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLG] [Court of Appeals for Selected Matters
in Bavaria] Feb. 11, 2003, 2004 Entscheidungen des Bayerischen Obersten Landesgerichts in
Zivilsachen [BayObLGZ] 24 (ER.G.); Frank Woolridge, (_berseering Freedom of
Establishment of Companies Affirmed 14 EuR. Bus. L. REv. 227, 231-32 (2003); Eva
Micheler, Current Development, Recognition of Companies Incorporated in Other EU
Member States, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 521, 524 (2003); ef Wolf-Georg Ringe, Anmerkung,
58 DB 2806, 2807 (2005) (arguing that Daily Mail is still good law in light of the ECJ's
SEVTCjudgment, which dealt with an inbound case); Wulf-Henning Roth, From Centros to
Ueberseering: Free Movement of Companies, Pn'vate International Law, and Community
Law, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 177, 197 (2003) (stating that Member States will have to
reconsider their position on moving out as well). However, following the Lasteyie du
Saillantopinion, there are good reasons to believe that this is no longer the case.
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such a case. These clauses may be a sufficient deterrent in many
cases, at least as long as bankruptcy is not imminent.
Even when a "commitment" clause is in place, it is shareholders
who need to initiate a reincorporation, even though creditors need to
approve it. The ensuing distribution of powers between shareholders
and creditors is analogous to that between managers and shareholders
in the United States.' One could argue that in the theoretical case
where a move will increase the total value of the firm by improving the
position of creditors, but will take away some value from shareholders,
a reincorporation will not be implemented.'9'
As before, the crucial question is how well creditors are able to
deal with the issue on their own, in particular by contracting for a
commitment clause ex ante. Tort creditors are of course unable to
adjust, although a reincorporation to escape tort claims will not be
possible given that the private international law of torts typically
follows the lex loci commissi delict, meaning the law applied is the
law of the country in which the tort was committed.'92 With respect to
claims against the corporation, tort creditors will in most cases be
primarily interested in postinsolvency rules. However, reincorporation
may sometimes be a way to escape veil piercing.'93
190. Cf Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1470 (explaining that due to managerial veto power
over reincorporations, moves enhancing shareholder value will not ensue if they hurt
managers).
191. Of course, if lending is concentrated and negotiations can take place between
creditors and managers or controlling shareholders, leaving aside the possibility of bargaining
breakdowns, such a reincorporation may take place. Typically, sophisticated adjusting
creditors, such as the firm's main bank, will be able to stimulate the other groups to initiate a
negotiation. However, the benefits of Coasian bargaining are limited as it will probably be
used only to the benefit of adjusting creditors. On the other side of the bargaining table, it
seems also likely that only large shareholders and managers, but not the minority, will be
primary beneficiaries of the negotiations.
192. A theoretical case where corporate law could become relevant would be the
implementation of unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts in at least one country, as
famously proposed by Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimted
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Tort; 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880-81 (1991 ). Shareholders
would have an incentive to reincorporate if the firm is facing a mass tort claim.
193. See Stefan Leible, Rechts- und Geschiftshitigkeit. Kaufmannseigenschatl in
GRENZUBERSCHREITENDE GESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 98, § 10 cmt. 25 (stating that veil-
piercing claims for undercapitalization or commingling of assets are qualified as corporate
law by German courts and authors); Schall, supra note 9, at 1552 (suggesting that veil
piercing is to be considered corporate law); see also Amtsgericht Bad Segeberg [AG Bad
Segeberg] [Bad Segeberg District Court] Mar. 24, 2005, 17 C 289/04, 95 GMBHR 884 (2005)
(ER.G.) (rejecting a veil-piercing claim for undercapitalization against an English Ltd
because English law does not require private companies to have any capital). However, this
case was decided differently on appeal. SeeLG Kiel Apr. 20, 2006, 10 S 44/05, 61 BB 1314
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Furthermore, typically commitment clauses or acceleration
clauses will be stipulated only to the benefit of large adjusting
creditors. Again, sophisticated creditors may cooperate with
shareholders and managers to the detriment of less sophisticated ones,
namely by agreeing to a reincorporation in a jurisdiction where, for
example, tort creditors are treated badly but creditors whose claims are
collateralized are treated well.
Of course, Member States or the EC itself may provide for
creditor-protection tools in the event of a reincorporation provided, in
the former case, that they satisfy the Gebhard criteria.'9" A
reincorporation is now possible (or soon will be) either through a
cross-border merger or through the creation of a European company, in
both cases by merging the operating corporation into a wholly owned
shell corporation created in the reincorporation State.'95 Irrespective of
which of the two methods is selected, national rules providing "an
adequate system of protection of the interests of creditors" pursuant to
the Third Directive apply to such transactions.'96 Hence, one may
argue that all creditors are protected against the risk of opportunistic
reincorporations. However, as argued above,' 7 while sophisticated
creditors do not need such a system of protection, other creditors will
normally be unable to take advantage of it, with the possible exception
of tort creditors.'98
(2006); see also BGH Mar. 14, 2005, II ZR 5/03, 60 BB 1016 (2005) (rejecting a claim
against shareholders of an English company by analogy to the German rules about companies
prior to registration); cf Horst Eidenmfiller, Gesellschaftsrecht in AUSLANDISCHE
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN, supm note 64, § 4, at 85, cmts. 21-26, at 92-94 (arguing that the
German doctrine of Existenzvemichtungshafing--liability to creditors for endangering the
corporation's existence-follows corporate law); Gerald Spindler & Olaf Berner,
Gliubigerschutz im Gesellschaflsrecht nach Inspire Art, 50 REcHT DER WIRTSCHAFT:
BETRIBS-BERATER INTERNATIONAL 7, 11 (2004) (ER.G.) (same).
194. See Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165; cf Schall, supra note 9, at 1553 (suggesting that
even those German creditor-protection mechanisms cannot apply to U.K. companies under
the freedom of establishment).
195. See Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden.: The European Company as a Catalyst for
CompanyLawArbitage, 4 J. COR. L. STUD. 77, 79-80 (2004).
196. Third Directive, supra note 131, art. 13; Cross-Border Merger Directive, supM
note 73, art. 2, par. 2; Council Regulation 2157/2000, supra note 133, art. 24.
197. See supm Part III.A.3.
198. But see discussion supra note 137.
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4. Conclusion
As we have seen, EC corporate law offers considerable leeway
for regulatory arbitrage vis-A-vis creditors. On the positive side,
regulatory competition is likely to remove mere slack, such as
minimum capital, from which creditors derive no actual benefit.
However, the outcome with respect to rules creditors actually may have
an interest in depends on whether creditors are able to adjust to
differences in the creditor-protection mechanisms of corporate law.
For adjusting creditors, reincorporation and other types of moral
hazards may be solved by covenants. This is not necessarily so for
others, and certainly not for tort creditors. The position of large,
sophisticated creditors who are able to adjust may actually be
enhanced by regulatory arbitrage, to the detriment of nonadjusting
groups of creditors.
Of course, the analysis of potential results of regulatory
competition depends to a considerable degree on whether Member
States actually have incentives to change their laws to attract
(re)incorporations, as Delaware does. About this, we remain
skeptical. 9' Admittedly, the fact that the U.K. Companies House
accepts financial statements drawn up under non-U.K. law for
purposes of the legal filing requirement may be taken as evidence that
it is actively engaging in regulatory competition.2" However, other
actors such as legislators and courts have a more important role in
shaping future law, and it remains to be seen whether they will actively
seek to attract foreign incorporations.
IV POSTINSOLVENCY RULES AND BANKRUPTCY FORUM SHOPPING
The increasing room for regulatory arbitrage in corporate law that
follows, or will follow, EC negative and positive harmonization
initiatives raises the issue of how corporate law and insolvency law
interact in situations where the two bodies of law to be applied are
from different Member States. There are in fact strong complements
between the two.2"' If companies were free to choose the applicable
corporate law and insolvency law, rules "could be selected that best fit
199. See Enriques, supm note 52, at 1266-73 (providing arguments for the
implausibility of a Delaware-like scenario within the EU); Gelter, supra note 81, at 259-64
(same).
200. SeeWesthoff, supra note 159, § 17, at 493.
201. SeeSch6n, supranote 183, at 353-54.
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the needs of shareholders and managers but not necessarily those of
creditors ('cherry-picking')."20 2 This is also true, albeit to a lesser
degree, if free choice is possible with regard to corporate law only; in
this case, corporate decision makers may choose the corporate law that
in the event of insolvency provides the best combination with the
relevant insolvency law from the point of view of managers and
shareholders. If reincorporation is an available option, the prospect of
more favorable treatment in bankruptcy, irrelevant as it might have
been at the incorporation stage, will become the main driver of
reincorporation decisions for companies on the brink of insolvency.
This Part inquires into the interactions between corporate and
insolvency law within the EU, providing an introduction to the most
relevant conflict-of-law rules. We subsequently reflect upon the
implications of bankruptcy forum shopping in Europe.
A. Postinsolvency Rules
In order to analyze the interactions between corporate law and
bankruptcy law in the post-Centros world, we first sketch out the
private international law framework for insolvencies within the EU.
The central piece of legislation in this area is now the EIR,2 3 but
attention will be given more specifically to two legal tools for creditor
protection particularly relevant for our analysis: fraudulent
conveyance laws and equitable subordination. The former can act as a
substitute for the legal-capital doctrine where, like in the United States,
such doctrine has been vestigialized.2° Hence, to the extent that legal
capital becomes less central in the EU as well, this tool may come to
the foreground. The latter provides a good example of a corporate law
doctrine that Member States may relatively easily relabel as an
insolvency law tool.
1. Harmonization of Conflict-of-Law Rules in Insolvency Law: The
European Insolvency Regulation in a Nutshell
In sharp contrast to the US. experience, where bankruptcy law is
federal, insolvency law is still a matter of national law within the EU:
no relevant substantive harmonization of EU insolvency rules has ever
202. Eidenmiiller, supra note 13, at 435.
203. EIR, supra note 10.
204. SeegenurallyEnriques & Macey, supra note 14, at 1185-95.
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been adopted (nor attempted) at the EC level. 25 However, in 2000, the
EIR was passed in order to enhance cooperation among jurisdictions in
insolvency proceedings by harmonizing conflict-of-law issues relating
to insolvencies2 °
The EIR identifies the Member States having jurisdiction to open
insolvency proceedings by introducing a distinction between main
proceedings, which have a universal effect (at least within the EU), and
secondary proceedings, which can be opened if the debtor has an
establishment and if the effects of the proceedings extend to assets
situated in the territory of the establishment's Member State.0 7 The
EIR identifies the law applicable to insolvency proceedings as the law
of the State of the court opening the proceedings, with a number of
exceptions. °8 It also introduces the principle of mutual recognition of
insolvency proceedings and provides rules for the coordination of
main and secondary proceedings °.2 9 Finally, the EIR contains rules on
information for creditors and on lodgment of their claims. 0 What is
relevant here are the rules determining the competent court and, hence,
the applicable insolvency law and its scope.
In general it can be said, at least it was the drafters' intention, that
the EIR displays a strong disfavor for regulatory competition in
insolvency law. As the preamble to the EIR puts it: "It is necessary for
the proper functioning of the internal market to avoid incentives for the
parties to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member
State to another, seeking to obtain a more favourable legal position
(forum shopping)."" As we shall see, the regulatory framework is
only partly consistent with such an objective. However, it is apparent
that if doubt arises in the interpretation of the EIR, the preamble
provides an important guideline against any interpretation favoring
parties' free choice of the insolvency regime.
The core provisions in the EIR are articles 3 and 4 on
international jurisdiction and applicable law, respectively. According
205. For an account of the few substantive harmonization measures in the insolvency
law field, see MIGUEL VIRGOS & FRANCISCO GARCIMARTiN, THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY
REGULATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 9 (2004).
206. SeeEIR, supra note 10.
207. See id. art. 3. Article 2(h) defines an establishment as "any place of operations
where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and
goods." On this notion, see, e.g., VIRGOs & GARCIMARTiN, supra note 205, at 158-62.
208. SeeEIR, supmrnote 10, arts. 4-15.
209. Id. arts. 16-38.
210. Id arts.39-42.
211. Id pmbl., para. 4.
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to article 3, jurisdiction for main proceedings is identified according to
the COMI criterion, while secondary proceedings can be opened
where the debtor has an establishment."2 Under article 4, "the law
applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects shall be that of
the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are
opened" (lex fo1i concursus). 3  The EIR further provides a
nonexhaustive list of matters included in the lex fori concursus,
ranging from "the conditions for the opening of th[e] proceedings" to
"the rules relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of
legal acts detrimental to all the creditors." '2 However, it contains a
number of exceptions to the lex fori concursus, such as those
concerning third parties' rights in rem and contracts of employment,
including an important qualification with regard to detrimental acts."5
Despite COMI's key role in determining jurisdiction and in
solving conflict-of-law issues in insolvency, there is surprisingly no
definition of COMI in the text of the EIR. Instead, there is a rebuttable
presumption that for companies and legal persons, "the place of the
registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests
in the absence of proof to the contrary."2"6  The rationale for this
presumption is that a corporation's head office is usually situated
where the corporation has its registered office."7 This presumption is
by no means evidence of the lawmakers' willingness to favor debtor's
choice in insolvency matters."8
A definition of COMI can, however, be found in the preamble to
the EIR, where it states: "The [COMI] should correspond to the place
where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a
regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties."219 Legal
scholars and courts across the EU agree that what counts is where the
212. Id. art. 3, paras. 1-2.
213. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
214. Id. art. 4, paras. 2, 2(m). On the rules relating to the voidness, voidability, or
unenforceability of legal acts, see infa Part IV.B.
215. EIR supra note 10, arts. 5-15; see infraPart IVB.
216. EIR supra note 10, art. 3, para. 1.
217. See, e.g., ViRG6s & GARCIMARTN, supm note 205, at 44; Miguel Virgos &
Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, in THE EC
REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE 263,
para. 75, at 281-82 (Gabriel Moss et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter EIR COMMENTARY].
218. But see Armour, supra note 9, at 407-08 (arguing that the presumption created by
EIR article 3(1) should be "a strong one").
219. EIR, supra note 10, pmbl., para. 13. According to Virg6s and Garcimartin, for
various reasons this definition has "the same value as the definitions contained in Article 2."
ViRGOs & GARCIMARTIN, supra note 205, at 39-40.
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"head office functions are carried out" on a regular basis, rather than
where the head office is located.22°
A thorough investigation into the meaning of COMI is
unnecessary here. Suffice it to say, despite the emphasis in the
preamble and in commentaries on the EIR on the fact that
"transparency and objective ascertainability are dominant factors" in
determining COMI,22' it is unquestionable that COMI is a highly
ambiguous and manipulative concept that requires subjective and fact-
intensive evaluation by judges.22 As a consequence, not only insolvent
companies with international operations, but also their creditors, are
able to some degree to select the forum (and hence the law) of their
choice. This is especially true with regard to subsidiaries within a
group of companies. As a number of precedents already show, it is
both easy for the court where the subsidiary has its administration (and
registered seat) and for the court where the parent has its COMI to
claim jurisdiction over the subsidiary's insolvency.223
Because it is the filing time that determines COMI, debtors may
shop for friendlier insolvency laws also by switching COMI when
220. In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562 (Ch.) (Eng.); MG Rover Ir. Ltd,
[2005] EWHC 874 (Ch.) (Eng.); Tribunale di Roma [Trib. di Roma] [Ordinary Court of First
Instance], 26 nov. 2003, 2004 RIvISTA DI DRITIO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE
691 (Ciio Holding Luxembourg S.A.); Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-
3813, paras. 26-37.
221. Ian F Fletcher, Scope and Jurisdiction, in EIR COMMENTARY, supra note 217, at
35, 39; cf AG Miinchen May 4, 2004, 1501 IE 1276/04, 25 ZEITSCHREFT FOR
WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT UND INSOLVENZPRAIS [ZIP] 962 (2004) (F.R.G.).
222. See MGRoverhI Ltd [2005] EWHC 874 (citing an unreported opinion by Judge
Langan where a decision based on COMI is called "a fact sensitive" one); Eidenmiiller, supra
note 13, at 428 (highlighting "the fuzziness of the COMI standard"); Sefa M. Franken, Three
Principles of Transnational Corporate Bankruptcy Law: A Review, 11 EuR. L.J. 232, 249-53
(2005) ("[COMI] is a highly manipulative concept, especially by debtors" that leaves "ample
discretion for creative judicial interpretation."); Bob Wessels, The European Union
Insolvency Regulation.- An Overview with Trans-Atlantic Elaborations, 2003 NORTON ANN.
SuRV. BANKR. L. 481, 503 (highlighting that decisions on COMI are "fact intensive"); Marc-
Philippe Weller, Inliindische Gl'ubigerinteressen bei internationalen Konzerninsolvenzen,
169 ZErrSCHRIFT FOR HANDELS- UND WiRTSCHAFrSRECHT [ZHR] 570, 578-83 (2005) (giving
an overview of the variety of locations courts have considered the COMI of an insolvent
corporation); Federico Maria Mucciarelli, Note, The Transfer of the Registered Office and
Forum-Shopping in International Insolvency Cases. An Important Decision from Italy, 2
EuR. COMPANY & FiN. L. REv. 512, 525 (2005) (same).
223. For a survey of the relevant cases, see Bob Wessels, International Jurisdiction To
Open Insolvency Proceedings in Europe, in ParticularAgainst (Groups ot) Companies 16-23
(2003), http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european-union/IntemJurisdictionCompanies.pdf.
See also Franken, supra note 222, at 250-53.
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insolvency is near.22 ' Of course, the switch of COMI immediately prior
to the filing will not pass the test of continuity that is implied in the
phrase "on a regular basis. 2' However, for switches taking place with
some anticipation, it might be difficult not to recognize the new
COMI, provided that the longer the time lag between the switch and
the filing, the more difficult to resort to general abuse or fraud
exceptions to disregard it.226
Incentives for forum shopping also derive from the EIR's solution
to the problem of conflicting decisions on the opening of main
proceedings. Based on the idea of mutual trust between EU courts, the
criterion is purely temporal. Once a main proceeding has been opened
by a court, other courts have to defer to that decision,27 only limited by
the public policy exception."8 As courts have a tendency to recognize
their own jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings, if only to protect
local creditors' interests,229 this temporal criterion implies that debtors
and creditors may engage in a race to file in order to place the case
224. Incidentally, this creates an internal inconsistency in the EIR. If it is true that the
perspective determining where the COMI is located should be that of potential creditors, then
by identifying COMI with respect to potential creditors' hypothetical determinations at the
time of filing, in the case of a switch of COMI, the court will necessarily have to disregard
any prior determination about COMI by creditors predating the switch. See ViRGrS &
GARCmvARTiN, supra note 205, at 42. Of course, one may reason that existing creditors who
failed to contract for a covenant preventing switches of COMI accepted the risk of such a
switch and, hence, can be disregarded in determining COMI. This sounds like a fairly
groundless assumption with regard to unsophisticated creditors, however.
225. See VIRG~s & GARCIMARTiN, supra note 205, at 41, 50; see also Case C-1/04,
Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. 1-701 (finding that the Member State where a request to
open insolvency proceedings is filed retains jurisdiction even if the debtor moves its COMI to
another Member State subsequently).
226. Cf VIRci6s & GARCIMARTiN, supra note 205, at 41; Massimo V Benedettelli,
"Centro degli interessipnncipali" del debitore e forum shopping nella disciplina comunitaria
delleprocedure diinsolvenza transfrontalier, 40 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO
E PROCESSUALE 499, 529 (2004).
227. SeeWessels, supm note 222, at 503 n.39.
228. EIR, supra note 10, art. 26; see also In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd, [2005] B.C.C. 999
(Ir.) (deferring to the ECJ the question of whether Irish courts may refuse recognition of a
Parma court's decision made after failure to grant the temporary administrator of an Irish
company the right to a fair hearing before it).
229. See Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.
31, 82-83 (2001); Weller, supra note 222, at 581 (referring to the Member State court's
conduct as far as "mutual 'insolvency imperialism' ["wechselseitiger 'Insolvenz-
imperialismus']); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unmvels, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J.
143, 149-52 (2005) (noting that in the EU, courts tend to claim jurisdiction even when they
clearly do not have it). But see Trib. di Rimini, 6 apr. 2004, 2005 GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA
1199 (In re Giacomelli Sport Groups s.p.a. in amministrazione stmordinatia-Giacomelli
Sport Espafia S.A.) (denying jurisdiction over a Spanish subsidiary of a failed Italian
corporation).
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before a given (and supposedly friendlier) court and, hence, to obtain
the most convenient applicable law.23°
To the extent that the EIR leaves some room for regulatory
arbitrage in insolvency law, it is worth dealing briefly with the scope of
the lex foi concursus as a useful introduction to the discussion in Part
JVB on whether "relabeling" corporate law rules as insolvency law
rules can be a viable strategy for Member States. Without going into
the details of the matters mentioned in article 4 and of the carve-outs in
articles 5 through 15, it is again in the preamble that we find a general
criterion to determine what issues are covered by the lex fii
concuNsus. T" Paragraph 6 of the preamble provides: "In accordance
with the principle of proportionality this [r]egulation should be
confined to provisions governing jurisdiction for opening insolvency
proceedings and judgments which are delivered directly on the basis of
the insolvency proceedings and are closely connected with such
proceedings. 32 This criterion is clearly reminiscent of ECJ case law
regarding Council Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels Regulation) on civil
jurisdiction and, more precisely, on the scope of article 1(2)(b), which
declares the Brussels Regulation inapplicable to bankruptcy.233  The
case law had in fact clarified that this provision extends to all actions
deriving directly from the bankruptcy proceeding; i.e., whose outcome
depends upon insolvency law, and closely connected to it, from a
procedural point of view."M In Gourdain v Nadler, the ECJ concluded
that the French action en comblement du passif is part of bankruptcy
law after conducting an independent characterization of the relevant
French provisions and giving, of course, no weight to the "label" of the
relevant provisions, i.e., whether they were located in French
insolvency statutes or elsewhere.2 3 The Court gave weight instead to
the following: (1) the only competent court was the insolvency court;
(2) only the liquidator could bring suit; (3) the rules on the burden of
230. A race to file is facilitated by the ECJ's opinion in the Eurofoodcase. The ECJ
affrmed that once any Member State has opened insolvency proceedings, the other States do
not have the power to review the decision. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R.
1-03813, paras. 111-112; see Thomas Bachner, The Battle over Junsdicton in European
Insolvency Law, 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REv. 310, 316-19, 325-27 (2006) (criticizing the
ECJ's reference to mutual trust).
231. See EIR, supra note 10.
232. Id pmbl., para. 6 (emphasis added).
233. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).
234. SeeVIRGOS &GARCIMARTN, supra note 205, at 61.
235. Case 133/78, 1979 E.C.R. 733, 743. The legal basis for this type of lawsuit is C.
COM. art. L624-3 (Fr.).
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proof derogated from the general ones under the law of liability;
(4) the statute of limitations was linked to a certain stage of the
insolvency proceeding; (5) if the action succeeded, it would be the
general body of creditors that would benefit; and (6) managers could
be declared insolvent in case they did not discharge their liabilities
toward the creditors without inquiring into whether the relevant
requisites for their declaration of insolvency existed.23
2. Fraudulent Conveyance
All EU jurisdictions have rules against fraudulent conveyance (or
fraudulent transfers) and preferences for certain creditors, permitting
237recovery of funds from the recipients of such conveyances.
Similarly, most states in the United States enacted either the older
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act or the newer Uniform
Fraudulent Transfers Act,238 and the federal Bankruptcy Code includes
an equivalent statute on transfers239 and another one on preferences."'
Those statutes cover transactions in which the debtor did not receive"reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer" and "for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction."'" The provision is interpreted
widely to include also dividends and share repurchases. 4 2 Because the
applicable fraudulent-transfer law does not depend on the state of
incorporation, corporations are not subject to regulatory competition
(between different corporate law regimes) in the United States.4 3 In
236. Gourdain, 1979 E.C.R. at 744.
237. See VIRGS & GARCIMARTiN, supra note 205, at 134.
238. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 81 (5th ed. 2006).
239. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
240. Id. § 547.
241. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999).
242. CLARK, supra note 166, at 88-90 (discussing dividends); Andreas Engert, Life
Without Legal Capital: Lessons from American Law, in LEGAL CAPITAL IN EUROPE, supra
note 110, at 646, 669-80; Marcel Kahan, Legal Capital Rules and the Structure of Corporate
Law: Some Observations on the Differences Between European and US Approaches, in
CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 145, 146 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymmeersch eds.,
2003) (discussing both dividends and share repurchases); see also APAC-Va., Inc. v. Jenkins
Landscaping & Excavating, Inc. (in re Jenkins Landscaping & Excavating, Inc.), 93 B.R. 84,
88 (WD. Va. 1988); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 E Supp. 556, 583-85 (M.D. Pa.
1983); Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc. (In re Desert View Bldg.
Supplies, Inc.), 475 F Supp. 693, 695-96 (D. Nev. 1978); Mancuso v. Champion (In re Dondi
Fin. Corp.), 119 B.R. 106, 113 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
243. SeeGelter, supranote 81, at 281; Kahan, supranote 242, at 148.
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theory, fraudulent-transfer laws could take the function of provisions
on legal capital-limiting dividends in Europe and of the concealed-
distribution doctrines used in some countries.2"
The EIR does not apply to statutes on conveyances and
preferences outside bankruptcy. In that context, the only restraint on
Member States is primary EC law.4' However, any rule of this kind is
superseded by the EIR once the corporation enters into bankruptcy,
meaning that any conflict-of-law rules applied by Member States
outside bankruptcy will be of very limited significance. Under the
EIR, as a general rule, the law of the state opening insolvency
proceedings determines "the rules relating to the voidness, voidability
or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the creditors."2 6 The
Elk, however, also provides for an important exception to this rule,
which may even allow for some "separate" forum shopping
concerning preferences. The general rule does not in fact apply when
the person benefiting from the act proves: (1) the "act is subject to the
law of a Member State other than that of the State of the opening of
proceedings," and (2) "that law does not allow any means of
244. Cf Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 E2d 635, 647 (3d Cir.
199 1) (discussing the reasonable equivalent-value requirement in the context of a leveraged
buyout).
245. For example, the respective German statute states that a legal act will be evaluated
under the law applying to its effects ( Wirkungsstatutor lex causae). ANFG § 19. Apparently,
the majority opinion in Germany interprets this as the law governing the contract or, in the
more important case where a creditor seeks to rescind a transfer of title, the lex rei sitae (i.e.,
the location of the property in question). See Ulrich Huber, Das flir &ie anfechtbare
Rechtshandlung madgebende Rechb in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ANDREAS HELDRICH 695, 701
(Stephan Lorenz et al. eds., 2005) (summarizing and criticizing the prevailing opinion).
Similarly, Austrian courts have subjected conveyances to Austrian law if the property in
question was located in Austria. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] May 23,
1984, 3 Ob 507/84, 27 ZEITscHRiFr FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 290 (1986) (Austria). But
see OGH Apr. 27, 2006, 2 Ob 196/04v, 129 JURISTISCHE BLATrER [JBI] 61 (2007) (holding
that the most important factor in determining the applicable law is in which country the
reduction of funds available for creditors took place). For Italy, compare Corte di cassazione
[Cass.] [Court of Last Appeal in Civil and Criminal Matters], sez. un., 7 may 2003, n.6899,
2004 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PR1VATO E PROCESSUALE 635, 640-44 (finding that
Italian judges have jurisdiction on a fraudulent-conveyance action on the basis of lex
contactus). For France, see YVON LOUSSOUARN ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRFVt 514 (8th
ed. 2004) (concurring in the scholarly opinion that Jex contactus applies to actiopauliana).
246. EIR, supm note 10, art. 4, par. 2(m). The German and French versions of the
text lend themselves to the conclusion that it need not be shown that each individual creditor
was harmed, but that the language actually means the general body of creditors. Gabriel
Moss & Tom Smith, Commentary on Council Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency
Proceeding in EIR COMMENTARY, supra note 217, at 155, para. 8.86, at 180.
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challenging that act in the relevant case."2 '7 As a result, the more
lenient of the two provisions always applies if the beneficiary satisfies
the burden of proof.248 The crucial question is, of course, which
country's law applies to the relevant act. The literature generally seems
to imply that the law applicable to the transaction under the
conventional rules of the private international law of contract apply.249
This may allow the parties entering into a contract to choose a
relatively lenient fraudulent-transfers regime independently from
where insolvency proceedings are carried out, most obviously by a
choice-of-law clause. °
In light of this, conveyances will take part in "general" forum
shopping and in regulatory competition for insolvency law, if there is
any. To conclude, article 13 leaves open some limited room for forum
shopping independent of bankruptcy.
3. Subordination
Several European jurisdictions have statutes or doctrines under
which loans given by shareholders to the corporation under certain
circumstances are subordinated to other debt in bankruptcy.25' The
economic rationale for such doctrines is that risk enhancement
resulting from the continued operation of the firm is detrimental to
third-party creditors because the proceeds available in liquidation will
typically be lower if the firm continues to operate because of the
loan.2  On the other side, shareholders will capture most of the
247. EIR, supra note 10, art. 13; see Insolvenzordnung [InsOl, Oct. 5, 1994, BGBI. I at
2866, as amended, Gesetz, Nov. 10, 2006, BGBI. I at 2553, art. 12, § 339 (ER.G.) (similar
text to the EIR applying the same criteria to cross-border insolvencies with non-EU
countries).
248. See Sebastian Zeeck, Die Ankniipfung der Insolvenzanfechtung, 2005
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE INSOLVENZRECHT [ZINsO] 281,287 (ER.G.).
249. See Henriette-C. Duursma-Kepplinger, Artikel 13, in EUROPAISCHE
INSOLVENZVERORDNUNG: KOMMENTAR 318, para. 16, at 324 (Henriette-C. Duursma-
Kepplinger et al. eds., 2002); Stuart Isaacs et al., The Effect of the Regulation on Cross-
Border Security and Quasi-Secuty in EIR COMMENTARY, supra note 217, at 91, cmt. 6.132,
at 128; Zeeck, supra note 248, at 286.
250. Isaacs et al., supra note 249, cmt. 6.127, at 127. To be sure, at least in some cases,
courts might consider this kind of transaction planning fraudulent or abusive. See Duursma-
Kepplinger, supra note 249, cmt. 16, at 324; Huber, supra note 245, at 711.
251. See n5a notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
252. See generally Martin Gelter, The Subordination of Shareholder Loans in
Bankruptcy, 27 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript available at
http://ssm.com/abstract--654222) (showing differences between the efficiency objective and
the incentive effects of subordination).
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benefits of continued operations because a successful turnaround of
the business will result in increased shareholder wealth, while the gains
creditors can make are typically only minute."3
The best known example is the German Kapitalersazrech4 which
covers not only loans given in times of crisis (not necessarily
insolvency, but under circumstances where only shareholders would
have extended a loan), but also loans not withdrawn at the onset of a
crisis. 5'  Similar doctrines exist in Austria,'2 5 Italy,2 6 Slovenia,257 and
other countries. 58 Similarly, U.S. courts developed the doctrines of
equitable subordinaon,259 which found statutory recognition in
§ 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978,260 and the more recent
recharacterizaton doctrine. 61 Other than the German doctrine, which
253. See genemrlly id.; Andreas Engert, Die dkonomische Begrindung der Grundshtze
ordnungsgemter Untemelnenslmnanzierung, 33 ZGR 813 (2004).
254. Kapitalersazrecht was originally developed by the courts. See, e.g.,
Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 22, 1938, 158 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 302 (ER.G.); RG Jan. 13, 1941, 166 RGZ 51; BGH
Dec. 14, 1959, 31 BGHZ 258. The doctrine was codified in 1980, but the courts continued to
apply the principles they had developed in parallel with the statutory rules. GmbHG, Apr. 20,
1892, RGB1. at 477, as amended, Gesetz, Mar. 22, 2005, BGBI. I at 837, art. 12, §§ 32(a)-(b);
see BGH Mar. 26, 1984, 90 BGHZ 370. For a historical overview, see GERHARD SCHUMMER,
DAs EIGENKAPITALERSATZRECHT: NOTWENDIGES RECHTSINSTITUT ODER IRRWEG? 7-81
(1998); Hans-Georg Koppensteiner, Kntik des "Eigenkapitalersatzrechts, "43 AG 308, 308-
09(1998).
255. Gesellschafts- und Insolvenzrechtsiinderungsgesetz 2003 [GIRAG 2003], BGBI.
I No. 92/2003, art. 1 (Austria). Article 1 is known as the Bundesgesetz iiber Eigenkapita
ersetzende Gesellschafterleistwngen [Eigenkapitalersatz-Gesetz-EKE6].
256. SeeCass. Civ., sez. un., 3 dec. 1980, n.6315, Giur. It. 1981, II, 895; Trib. Milano,
5 dec. 1988, 88 RIWSTA DI DIRiTrO COMMERCtALE II/75 (1990); Trib. Treviso, 18 dec. 2001, 55
BANCA, BORSA, TrrOLI DI CREDITO 11/723 (2002); Trib. Milano, 28 june 2001, 55 BANCA,
BoRSA, TITOLI DI CREDITO 723 (2002); see also Cass. Civ. sez. un., 19 mar. 1996, n.2314,
1996 SocIETA 1267; C.c. arts. 2467, 2497-quinquies (as introduced by Legislative Decree
No. 6 of Jan. 17, 2003, Gazz. Uff. Jan. 22, 2003, No. 17, Supplemento Ordinario). For an
overview, see Giovanni Tantini, I versamenti dei soci alla societ, in 1 ** TRATrATO DELLE
SOCIETA PER AzioNI, supra note 55, at 743, 795-800 (2004).
257. Zakon o gospodarskih druibah [ZGD-1] [Companies Act] 9t. 42/2006 Uradni list
Republike Slovenije [Ur.l. RS] §§433-434 (Slovn.); see Markus Bruckmiiller,
Eigenkapitalersatz in Slowenien, in EIGENKAPITALERSATZ IM OSTERREICHISCHEN,
ITALLENISCHEN UND SLOWENISCHEN RECHT 69 (Susanne Kalss & Friedrich Rfiffier eds., 2004).
258. See, e.g., Pietro Abbadessa, I problema dei prestiti dei soci nelle soci &
capitali" una proposta d soluzione, 15 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 1/497, 1/503 (1988)
(discussing Belgian and Portuguese law).
259. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939); Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-09 (1939).
260. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(2000).
261. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (!nreAutostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 E3d
726, 748-50 (6th Cir. 2001); Fett v. Moore (In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.), 438 E
Supp. 726, 729-30 (E.D. Va. 1977); In re Cold Harbor Assocs., 204 B.R. 904, 915 (Bankr.
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prohibits repayments while the corporation remains uncreditworthy,
the American doctrines apply only in bankruptcy. However, the crucial
point for issues of regulatory competition is that the equitable-
subordination doctrine, as part of the bankruptcy code, does not share
in regulatory competition for corporate law.
B. Forum Shopping for Insolvency Law
It is sometimes suggested that EU bankruptcy law as it
implements a uniform system of conflict-of-law rules is not quite
unlike the real-seat theory. The EIR, at first glance, seems to imply
that a specific COIvil can be determined for each individual firm.
However, the practical experience with the EIR during its first years
lends itself to a partly different conclusion. For firms active in one
country only, COMI is unambiguous, leaving no option for forum
shopping as far as different insolvency law regimes are concerned. By
contrast, firms with operations in different countries, and above all
international groups, have leeway to engineer insolvency proceedings
in one of the countries in question. The substantive rules of
bankruptcy are not a matter of federal law in Europe like they are in
the United States, and therefore one might speculate whether the result
will not be mere forum shopping, but actual regulatory competition,
which implies states adapting their law to attract insolvency filings.
There is little doubt that forum shopping has potential benefits.
In the United States, even though bankruptcy law is federal law, courts
have some discretion in the application of procedural and substantive
rules. Proponents argue that forum shopping has enabled bankrupt
firms to choose venues where judges are predictable, fast, and
competent in handling the reorganization of large firms.262 In other
words, incumbent managers may have been able to choose the forum
maximizing the total value of the reorganized firm (typically the New
York and Delaware courts). 63 Ex post value maximization may, in
some cases, harm creditors to the benefit of other interest groups (such
as shareholders and employees benefiting from continued operation),
which is efficient if the benefits to those groups exceed the harm to
creditors. Potential harm to creditors because of the evasion of
E.D. Va. 1997); see also David A. Skeel, Jr. & Georg Krause-Vilmar, Rechamcterization and
the Nontnndrance of Creditors, 7 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 259 (2006).
262. See Cole, supm note 5, at 1859-76; Ayotte & Skeel, supr note 5, at 15-17.
263. SeeCole, supranote 5, at 1859-76; Ayotte & Skeel, supm note 5, at 15-17.
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creditor-protection mechanisms therefore needs to be weighed against
the benefits of expostmaximization.
Likewise, gains from regulatory arbitrage can be made by
shopping between different European bankruptcy regimes.2" The
possibility of secondary insolvency proceedings concerning the
debtor's assets in another State mitigates these gains, but does not
eliminate them. In some cases, secondary procedures will not be an
option. First, the debtor needs to have an establishment in the country
where secondary proceedings are to take place.26 Second, proceedings
will typically not be opened where the very limited assets in the
relevant State are unlikely to cover costs.26' Third, secondary
proceedings will always result in the liquidation of assets, meaning that
it will matter a lot to creditors in which country a reorganization
procedure is initiated.67 Furthermore, the law of the Member State
will typically apply to certain procedures relating to insolvency, such
as the claims against directors.268 The particular powers of the
liquidator of the main proceedings and the obligation to transfer any
remaining assets to him may also make a difference.6 Finally, as a
practical matter, the race to file is a reality, as Eurofood JFSC Ltd.2 .
illustrates."1
In the subsequent analysis, we look exclusively at the possibility
of harm to creditors resulting from forum shopping. We first describe
the commitment problem resulting from COMI and then point out
some important differences from forum shopping for bankruptcy law
in the United States. We analyze who may act as "case placers," and
264. See Horst Eidenrmiiller, Wettbewerb der Insolvenzrechte 35 ZGR 467, 477
(2006) (pointing out that insolvency proceedings are completed significantly faster in the
United Kingdom than in France or Germany and that a much higher percentage of bank
claims are satisfied, creating an incentive for banks to seek a forum in the United Kingdom).
This data originally came from Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy
Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, Germany and the UIK (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 89/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=-647861.
265. EIR, supm note 10, art. 3, para. 2.
266. See, e.g., InsO. Oct. 8, 1994, BGBI. I at 2866, as amended, Gesetz, Nov. 10, 2006,
BGBI. I at 2553, § 26 (F.R.G.).
267. EIR, supra note 10, art. 27 (referring to annex B of the EIR).
268. See Marc-Philippe Weller, Forum Shopping im Internationalen Insolvenzrecht?,
24 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 412, 415 (2004); see also
infia notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
269. SeeEIR, supm note 10, arts. 29, 33, 35.
270. Case C-341/04, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813.
271. See infa note 281 and accompanying text.
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what consequences this may entail. Finally, we speculate whether
States will have any incentive to attract insolvencies.
1. Basic Structure
There are, of course, a number of notable differences between
insolvency and corporate law arbitrage. To begin with, the decision
about the applicable legal regime is not made at the stage of
incorporation, but rather when insolvency proceedings are to be
initiated. This compares to the situation described in Part III.B with
the crucial difference that the borrower is unable to commit to a
particular legal system. In fact, other than by avoiding transnational
activity that may result in an unexpected COMI altogether, firms
cannot commit to insolvency proceedings in a particular jurisdiction to
their creditors. The possibility of ex post forum shopping obviously
reduces ex ante predictability for creditors and therefore increases the
agency cost of debt.272 However, only a limited number of jurisdictions
will be an available option; even though an outsider may not be able to
determine the COMI ex ante and managers have some opportunity to
manipulate it, sophisticated creditors may be able to narrow down the
available options." To be sure, predictability may not be perfect, as
the approach taken by English courts with regard to the COMI
highlights: their COMI decisions have been criticized as being hard to
predict by outsiders." '
Second, the choice-of-law decision is not necessarily taken by the
insolvent corporation. A striking difference from the United States,
where involuntary bankruptcies are rare, lies in the persons who
petition for bankruptcy proceedings-the case placers." Bankruptcy
systems can be characterized as either manager-driven or manager-
272. See Franken, supra note 222, at 236.
273. SeeEidenmiiller, supm note 13, at 427-28.
274. See Franken, supn note 222, at 248-54. This lack of predictability is the reason
why several authors have suggested that ex ante free choice should be adopted; this would
both allow firms to choose the regime most appropriate to their governance structure and to
commit to a particular regime that can be ascertained by creditors. See, e.g., Franken, supm
note 222, at 242-46; Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies,
19 MCH. J. INT'L L. 1, 32-33 (1997); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing
Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporaons, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357,
1403 (2000). Others suggest that the bankruptcy forum should be bundled with corporate
law. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 9, at 407-08; Eidenmiiller, supra note 13, at 438-40.
275. Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Creditor Protecon, in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra
note 53, at 71, 74 n.16.
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displacing. 6 The U.S. bankruptcy system is the paradigmatic example
of a manager-driven system, with executives having powerful
incentives to file for chapter 11, which allows them to attempt a
turnaround of the corporation while staying in charge.277 By contrast,
European bankruptcy proceedings, including British ones, are
manager-displacing, as the corporation is typically liquidated or sold
piecemeal by an administrator.78 Directors are not rewarded with the
carrot of prolonged control over the corporation, but threatened with
the stick of liability in the case of a late filing. However, it appears that
this stick does not work effectively, because the case placers are
usually creditors."9
2. Conflicts of Interest on the Demand Side
Let us consider what happens when a corporation approaching
insolvency could make a case for its COMI in jurisdictions A and B.
Assume both systems are manager-displacing. Managers will fear
displacement and usually delay bankruptcy filings as long as possible.
If creditors are a homogeneous group, they will submit a petition for
bankruptcy in the jurisdiction maximizing the expected value accruing
to creditors, which is not necessarily the jurisdiction maximizing total
value.
280
If creditors are heterogeneous, and the law of jurisdiction A is
favorable to Group 1 (e.g., secured lenders), while jurisdiction B is
favorable to Group 2 (e.g., unsecured lenders, employees, and so on), 81
276. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and
Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325 (1998).
277. See John Armour, Brian R. Cheffons & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law" Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55
VAND. L. REv. 1699, 1727 (2002).
278. Seeid at 1723-30.
279. The reason may be that managers overestimate their chances of accomplishing a
turnaround and avoiding bankruptcy or that they fear a hindsight bias on the part of courts,
who will find them liable to creditors even if they filed for bankruptcy when they were legally
obliged.
280. For example, a Member State might offer a particularly effective reorganization
proceeding.
281. !n re MG Rover Espana S.A., [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3426, [8] (Eng.) ("[I]n striking
the balance between the interests of employees on the one hand the interests of finance and
trade creditors on the other, English insolvency law treats the claims of employees less
favourably than the law of other Member States."). Similarly, in the Eurofood case, recently
decided by the ECJ, Bank of America tried to place the case in Ireland, apparently to avoid
ending up in Parma under an insolvency law that is clearly much more favorable to unsecured
creditors than to secured ones (due to the broader scope of the Italian law on preferences and
fraudulent transfers, especially at the time of the proceeding's opening). This might have
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a race to file between creditors may develop."2 Its outcome may
depend on pure chance, but also on different prerequisites for
bankruptcy in different jurisdictions,"3 or even on the procedural rules
and safeguards for the debtor's right to a fair hearing.2" If one
jurisdiction allows a petition for (involuntary) bankruptcy earlier than
the other, the group of creditors favored by this jurisdiction will
prevail.
The prospect of forum shopping by creditors may create an
incentive for managers to file for bankruptcy. If jurisdiction A favors
creditors and jurisdiction B favors managers and shareholders, e.g.,
because rules on directors' liability and veil piercing are lenient, the
latter may have an incentive to file in B before creditors file in A,
using their information advantage. Again, the group favored by the
jurisdiction allowing the earlier onset of bankruptcy proceedings will
win. Note that the costs to managers will be not only monetary, but
also include the stigma of having run the corporation into bankruptcy.
This may mean that managers will sometimes still delay bankruptcy,
even though the bankruptcy proceedings of jurisdiction B favor them
in purely financial terms. Also, creditors will often prefer bankruptcy
harmed Bank of America's interests in light of the possibility of consolidating the procedures
relating to the various group entities. See Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-
3813. Compare Royal Decree No. 267 of mar. 16, 1942 art. 67, Gazz. Uff., apr. 6, 1942, No.
81, with Bankruptcy Act, 1988 (Act. No. 27/1988) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatute
book.ie/1988_27.html. In 2005, article 67 was amended to restrict its scope. See Decree-
Law No. 35 of mar. 14, 2005 art. 2(l)(d), Gazz. Uff., mar. 23, 2005, No. 68.
282. The difference between the two groups may stem from securitization or from a
preference for a specific location, as involvement in insolvency proceedings in a distant
country may be costly.
283. In some jurisdictions, bankruptcy can only be declared after finding that the
corporation is unable to pay debts as they become due. See, e.g., C. COM. art. L621-1 (Fr.);
Royal Decree No. 267 of mar. 16, 1942, art. 5, par. 2, Gazz. Uff., apr. 6, 1942, No. 81
(Italy); Faillissementswet [F] [Bankruptcy Law] art. 1 (Neth.); Prawo upadlociowe i
naprawcze [Law on Bankruptcy and Rehabilitation] 2003, No. 60, poz. 535 Dziennik Ustaw
[Dz. U.] (Pol.); Art. 2 of the Bankruptcy Act (Boletin oficial del Estado [B.O.E.] [Official
Gazette] 2003, 164) (Spain); Konkurslag [KonkL] [Bankruptcy Code] 1:2 (Swed.). By
contrast, the insolvency laws of other countries include overindebtedness as an additional,
alternative criterion for limited liability associations only. In its most basic form, it is fulfilled
when total debt exceeds total assets. See, e.g., Konkursordnung [KO] [Bankruptcy Code] No.
337/1914, as amended, § 67 (Austria); InsO, Oct. 5, 1994, BGBI. I at 2866, as amended,
Gesetz, Nov. 10, 2006, BGBI. I at 2553, art. 12, § 19; zkon [statute] 6. 7/2005 Zbierka
zAkonov [Zb.] [Collection of Statutes] (Slovk.); Zakon o fman~nem poslovanju podjetij
[ZFPPod] [Financial Operations of Companies Act] 9t. 54/1999 Ur.l. RS §§ 12-13 (Slovn.).
Needless to say, the interpretation of the criterion varies among jurisdictions.
284. This is also an area where Member States can be creative in anticipating the date
of an insolvency proceeding's opening. See discussion supra note 230.
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proceedings in, or close to, the state of their own residence and
consider bankruptcy proceedings abroad more costly.85 However, in
many cases, it will be possible to solve this problem by opening
secondary insolvency proceedings.86
Generally, there are still good reasons to believe that
managers/shareholders will usually beat creditors in the race to file.
As insiders, they possess a considerable information advantage,
allowing them to assess whether the corporation is eligible for
bankruptcy and possibly to win the race for filing because creditors do
not know yet that illiquidity is impending. Furthermore,
managers/shareholders will know better than creditors in which
countries a good case for COMI can be made, and what options are
available. Rational managers with sophisticated counsel should be
able to use forum-shopping opportunities to their advantage. However,
whether insiders will prevail in the way described, to some extent
depends on who the particular creditors are. If the corporation is
tightly supervised by a financial institution, the advantage may be
close to nonexistent. There are also reasons to believe that certain
groups of creditors will typically win over other groups in a race. In
many cases, sophisticated, secured creditors will be better informed
both about the financial situation of the debtor and about forum-
shopping opportunities. They may even enter coalitions with
managers to the detriment of nonadjusting creditors.
Most likely, forum shopping will be to the detriment of tort
creditors, who are unable to adjust their claims. A firm might move to
reincorporate, with the assent of large lenders protected by an
acceleration clause, in a jurisdiction where the position of tort creditors
is particularly bad, and establish a COMI there on the basis of the
presumption in article 3 of the EIR.
Note that a slight slant in favor of management may not
necessarily be detrimental in principle. Besides management, there
285. This was probably the issue in a recent case concerning a conflict of competence
between Czech and German courts. Czech creditors submitted a petition for bankruptcy in
Prague while the debtor, an unincorporated German entrepreneur, filed for bankruptcy in
Hamburg. Mstsk Soud [MS] [Circuit Court in the City of Prague] Apr. 26, 2005, 6j. 78 K
6/05-127, 26 ZIP 1431 (2005); LG Hamburg Aug. 18, 2005, 326 T 34/05, 26 ZIP 1697
(2005).
286. Cf Franken, supra note 222, at 255 ("[I]f creditors of an establishment located in
another Member State have statutory priority rights that do not have equivalents under the
home-country law, they can protect their priority position by filing for a secondary
bankruptcy proceeding.").
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may be other stakeholders with an interest in keeping the corporation
going, such as employees whose human capital is to some degree tied
up in the firm and not protected by complete contracting. To be sure,
Lynn LoPucki, the leading academic critic of bankruptcy forum
shopping in the United States, argues that forum shopping has hurt the
bankruptcy system by allowing bad management to stay in office and
by letting many prepackaged bankruptcies go through where the
insolvent corporation needs to refile within a few years.287 This may
indicate that forum shopping has allowed the U.S. system to tilt too
strongly in favor of reorganization.
3. Supply Side
On the supply side of the market for bankruptcy law, Member
States could theoretically offer postinsolvency rules catering to the
interests of any group. Among the strategies available, it may be most
promising to cater to managerial interest, given the managerial head
start in information. Because Member States have different
substantive bankruptcy laws, a State might even implement manager-
driven bankruptcy proceedings in order to attract filings.
It seems interesting to consider what strategies Member States
engaging in regulatory competition could take or, to put it differently,
what kind of law would attract case placers. The most obvious
example is a law providing strong managerial control in bankruptcy,
along U.S. lines. If managers and controlling shareholders with them
stay in control of the firm during bankruptcy by filing in a particular
country, it would give them a considerable ex post advantage over
creditors. Furthermore, states allowing early filings or petitions for
bankruptcy would also be attractive, at least to the group favored by
bankruptcy proceedings in that particular state. 9 The favored group,
be it managers or a particular segment among creditors, could seize the
opportunity to initiate filings. The supply of a bankruptcy law
287. See LoPucKI, supra note 6, at 97; LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 6, at 270-71.
288. For a more positive assessment of bankruptcy venue choice in the United States,
see Cole, supra note 5, at 1859-76; Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 5, at 1396-406; Skeel,
Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue, supra note 5, at 27-29; Skeel, Whats So Bad
About Delaware? supra note 5, at 326-28; Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 5, at 1517.
289. For example, under section 123 of the U.K. Insolvency Act, default on an
undisputed debt over £750 is sufficient to prove insolvency, whereas in Germany, the creditor
needs to show that the debtor is unable, and not merely unwilling, to pay. See Schall, supra
note 9, at 1538. The leading English case is Comnill Insuranceplc v Improvement Services
Ld, [1986] WL.R. 114 (Ch.) (Eng).
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favorable to any particular group should thus be made more attractive
by allowing that group to file early before an interested group launches
a petition in another state.
As in regulatory competition for corporate law, any influence on
the development of the law as such hinges on whether its suppliers
have an incentive to cater to the interests of decision makers. Only if
there is such an incentive will the development of the law itself be
influenced, turning mere forum shopping into actual regulatory
competition. The biggest problems for regulatory competition are
incentives on the supply side, which are often idiosyncratic and hard to
predict. According to Lynn LoPucki, judges are motivated by the
glamour of handling "celebrity" bankruptcies and their increased
standing in the community resulting from it.2  While this may have
been the original incentive for the individual judges who started
attracting cases to New York and Delaware, pressure from local
bankruptcy bars that wanted to avoid losing business to Delaware,
seems to have become an important factor later.29' Still, even this has
not become a universal incentive for other courts to adapt their
procedures. 92
Although there is little doubt that the potential rents to be gained
from forum shopping are bigger if not just minor differences in the
interpretation of a single bankruptcy code (as in the United States), but
a variety of bankruptcy laws are at issue, " ' it is too early to conclude
that legislators will enter regulatory competition under the EIR regime.
First, the gains to be made are probably limited to a considerable
degree by secondary insolvency proceedings. Second, the number of
firms where gains are possible is relatively small. To be sure, this may
be true also in the United States, where forum shopping for chapter 11"prepacks" seems to be an option mainly for large borrowers.
Similarly, the COMI standard grants forum-shopping opportunities
only to firms with considerable international activities and, by means
of the presumption of COMI in the state of incorporation, to pseudo-
foreign companies. However, COMI allows case placers to choose
among a limited selection of venues; while in the United States, "large
290. LoPuciu, supa note 6, at 19-20.
291. Seeid. at 124-28.
292. See id. at 21-24 (discussing Boston judges' refusal to enter the competition).
293. Seeid. at207.
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public companies [are] free to file their bankruptcies pretty much
anywhere they [choose]."29 4
These two factors combined make it rather unlikely that local
bankruptcy lawyers in Europe will have to fear loss of large portions of
their business. It is hard to see why Member States should allow
themselves to be pressured into changing their bankruptcy laws in
ways that give rent-seeking opportunities to managers or other groups.
Given that Member States themselves can hardly gain financially from
handling bankruptcy proceedings, the crucial issue probably is to what
extent particular groups (bankruptcy lawyers in particular) will be able
(and have an incentive) to influence legislators, or possibly judges, to
change the law or its interpretation to generate revenue for the bar.
4. Conclusion
The EIR offers ex post forum-shopping opportunities that
European bankruptcy systems will have to address. Although an ex
ante commitment to a particular bankruptcy system would likely be
beneficial, COMI and its ambiguities for multinational groups and
companies are here to stay. Consequently, at least some creditors are
likely to be hurt by forum shopping. That said, we can reasonably
predict that states will not actively compete to attract bankruptcies.
V THE "RELABELING" OF CORPORATE LAW RULES AS INSOLVENCY
LAW RuLES: LIMITS AND IMPLICATIONS
Shortly after Centros opened the door for regulatory arbitrage in
the corporate law field, the Council adopted a regulation which
seemingly ruled out forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage in the
bankruptcy law field. While we have seen that such objective was far
from attained by the EIR, it is also true that whatever State succeeds in
opening the insolvency proceedings will be able to apply its own
insolvency law rules, even to foreign entities, with due exceptions and
qualifications. Hence, States (and legal scholars before them) may be
tempted to requalify corporate law rules as insolvency law rules so as
to apply their domestic law to foreign entities, as though Centros did
not exist. With respect to postinsolvency corporate law rules, i.e.,
those that de facto operate only if a corporation becomes insolvent, the
294. Id. at 15.
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outcome of such a relabeling would be practically the same as prior to
Centros.
As a matter of fact, various commentators do consider insolvency
law (and tort law) to be a sort of safe haven protecting domestic
provisions from review by the ECJ.295 However, two caveats need to be
made. First, secondary EC law (like the EIR) can hardly mend a
violation of prnary law by a Member State. Second, it is not evident
why the ECJ should take a formalistic perspective and bother to
consider in which field of national law a creditor-protection
mechanism falls if its effects are identical.29 In fact, as we have seen in
Part IVA, the ECJ's criteria for the qualification of rules as insolvency
law are autonomous from national laws and are strictly related to
substantive and procedural features of bankruptcy law.
In light of Gourdain, for instance, commentators tend to exclude
claims that can be brought irrespective of whether a corporation goes
bankrupt, like claims against directors for breach of their ongoing
duties, that are among those covered by the lex fi concursus." ' Of
course, actions based on English provisions on wrongful trading would
certainly be included among those covered by the English lex [cri
concursus, should a proceeding be opened in England.98  Similarly,
claims against directors arising from breach of the duty to file for
insolvency are also held to be covered by the lex foi concursus2 9
295. See, e.g., Christian Kersting & Clemens Philipp Schindler, The ECIJ Inspire Art
Decision of3O September 2003 and Its Effects on Practice, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1277, 1290 (2003)
("Existenzvemichtungshaflug... or liability for undercapitalization can only be applied to
foreign companies if they are understood as institutes of the law of torts or of insolvency
law."); Hanno Merkt, Creditor Protection and Capital Maintenance from a German
Perspective, 15 EUR. Bus. L. REv. 1045, 1057 (2004) ("[A] tort law based solution would, as a
general legal principle, be immune to findings that it violates the principle of freedom of
establishment."); Ulmer, supra note 62, at 1207.
296. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 9, at 405-06; Eidenmiiller, supra note 174, § 3 cmt.
9; Kieninger, supra note 93, at 753; Karsten Schmidt, Publiztit von "'Schein-
Auslandsgeselschaften" dutch Firmenrecht nd durch Angaben auf Geschdl~sbiefen, in
EUROPAiSCHE AUSLANDSGESELLSCHtAFrEN iN DEUTSCHLAND 15, 25 (Marcus Lutter ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Schmidt, Publazit'd; Karsten Schmidt, Verlust der Mitte durch 'IJnspire Art"?-
Verwerfungen im Unternehmensrecht durch Schreckreaklionen der Literatur-, 168 ZHR
493,499 (2004).
297. See Case 133/78, Gourdain v. Nadler, 1979 E.C.R. 733 (discussed supra note
235); Virgos & Schmit, supranote 217, para. 172, at 301.
298. See Schall, supra note 9, at 1549.
299. See ViRGs & GARCIMARTIN, supra note 205, at 82; Horst Eidenmtiller,
Insolvenzrech4 in AUSLANDISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 64, § 9, at 310, cmts.
25-33, at 317-18; see also Gerd Leutner & Olaf Langner, Durchgriffshaiung bei
Scheinauslandsgesellschafien, 2005 ZINsO 575, 577 (suggesting that German
Insolvenzveschleppungshalhmg should apply when an insolvency proceeding is opened in
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However, this view is not uniformly held; some authors and recently
one lower court have in fact argued that issues of liability for late filing
should be decided according to the law of incorporation,3" although
this case was decided differently on appeal."'
Hence, the relabeling of corporate law provisions as insolvency
law may only work provided that these provisions are properly
"insolvencified," i.e., as long as a sufficient number of features linking
them to the insolvency proceeding and its objectives are introduced.
As a consequence, in most cases insolvencification cannot be the
product of scholarly or judicial interpretation. Instead, an intervention
by national lawmakers and a profound revision of existing legal
doctrines will be needed for relabeling to be successful.
Further, insolvencification may prove to be useless for extending
the scope of domestic laws to entities incorporated in other Member
States. Whenever insolvency law rules may be held to have a more
than indirect and uncertain impact upon the exercise of freedom of
establishment, they also must be consistent with the Gebhardcriteria.0 2
Admittedly, insolvency law or tort law rules will typically apply
without regard to the particular legal form, meaning that one of the
Gebhardcriteria-application in a nondiscriminatory manner-will be
met more or less automatically, which is in stark contrast to pseudo-
foreign corporation statutes.3 3 But no such automatism will work with
regard to the other criteria.
Germany and citing Gourdain as an important argument); Rouven Redeker, Die ForthrUng
insolvenzreifer Gesellschaflen nach "1nspire Art, "2005 ZINSO 1035, 1037 (same); Friedrich
Riiffler, Die Behandlung von ScheinauslandsgeselIschaien, 2 GES 411, 416-17 (2005)
(same); Philipp Ungan, Gli'ubigerschutz nach dem EuGH-Urteil in "'Inspire Art"-
Mdglichkeiteneiner Sondeamnknipfung fir die Durchgnffshaihng in der Insolvenz, 104
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWiSSENSCHAFr 355, 368 (2005) (same).
300. See, e.g., Spindler & Berner, supra note 193, at 12; Sebastian Mock & Charlotte
Schildt, Insolvenz auslindischer Gesellschalten mit Sitz in Deutschland, in
GRENZOBERSCHREITENDE GESELLSCHAFrEN, supra note 98, § 16 cmts. 43-48; see also AG
Bad Segeberg Mar. 24, 2005, 17 C 289/04, 95 GmBHR 884 (2005) (rejecting a claim for
damages on the grounds that English law applies and German law cannot be superimposed in
light of ECJ case law).
301. LG Kiel Apr. 20, 2006, 10 S 44/05, 61 BB 1314 (2006) (qualifying the duty to
file for insolvency as corporate law and allowing a damages claim against an English Ltd
under German law and arguing that this was compatible with EC law).
302. See Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165; Armour, supm note 9, at 405.
303. Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-4165; see Schanze & Jiittner, supr note 62, at 668
(pointing out that general laws of commercial traffic-allgemeines Verkehrsrecht-will
usually not violate primary law); Schmidt, Pubizit9 supm note 296, at 25-26 (pointing out
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As previously hinted in Part IVA, at least in theory fraudulent
conveyance could be one of the areas where insolvencification, i.e., the
introduction of rules that are functionally equivalent or similar to rules
previously found in corporate law, may work out within the EU.
Fraudulent-conveyance rules can in fact tackle opportunistic behavior
in the form of asset diversion similarly to corporate law's limits on
distributions. The problem is that EIR's article 13 opens the door to
regulatory arbitrage with regard to these kind of rules. Because, of
course, insolvencification could not take place on a discriminatory
basis, it would mean opening the door for regulatory arbitrage for
domestic as well as foreign companies. If companies started to engage
in concealed distributions through contracts for which parties chose
the law of a Member State not allowing for any means of challenging
them, the relabeling of rules limiting distributions as fraudulent
transfer might hinder the effectiveness of rules aimed at preventing
asset diversion in jurisdictions where concealed distributions are now
covered by corporate law.
Finally, we have seen that at least in some countries, like
Germany, the qualification of the equitable-subordination doctrine is
disputed."°a In light of the discussion of ECJ case law on bankruptcy
above, which is construed narrowly to refer only to "judgments which
are delivered directly on the basis of the insolvency proceedings and
are closely connected with such proceedings " '30 it seems clear that a
subordination doctrine such as the German one that becomes
applicable before insolvency and can result in a duty of shareholders
not to recall the loan even if the corporation does not go bankrupt,
does not necessarily fall under the scope of the EIR.3 °  The question of
that provisions regulating commercial conduct are less likely to violate primary EU law than
rules erecting entry barriers).
304. See Eidenmiiller, supm note 299, cmts. 42-43 (qualifying the rules as corporate
law); Forsthoff & Schulz, supa note 98, cmts. 40-47. But see Ulrich Huber,
Gesellschaflerdarlehen in der Inlandsinsolvenz von Auslandsgesellschaflen, In EUROPAISCHE
AuSLANDSGESELLSCHAFrEN iN DEUTSCHLAND, supa note 296, at 131-221 (arguing only the
statutory rules (Novellen-Regeln), but not the independent case law (BGH-Regeln), should
apply to foreign corporations); Ulmer, supa note 62, at 1207 (same); Weller, supra note 268,
at 414 (same); Z6lner, supra note 94, at 6 (same). For Austria, see Sabine Dommes et al.,
Die englische Private Company Limited h7 sterreich--Gesellschaftsrechtliche Fragen, 15
STEUER UND WiRTSCHAFT INTERNATIONAL 477, 484 (2005).
305. EIR, supra note 10, pmbl., para. 6.
306. However, the German Ministry of Justice has recently proposed an amendment to
German corporate and insolvency law that would make subordination an insolvency concept.
This would (if implemented) apply to all business associations that do not have a personally
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whether a Member State can apply such a provision to foreign
corporations would have to be decided under the Gebhard criteria. In
any case, it seems safe to say that certain rules could be recast to fall
under the reach of the EIR directly by establishing a reasonable
connection to insolvency proceedings, while the main thrust of the rule
remains the same.
But where effective relabeling is feasible, is it truly desirable from
the perspective of a Member State intending to implement its own
policies for creditor protection? The above discussion of forum
shopping in European bankruptcy law casts serious doubts on this
proposition. The better relabeling works and the larger the field
covered by bankruptcy law, the smaller the opportunistic gains that can
be made by regulatory arbitrage in corporate law. However, on the
flipside of the coin, the reduced significance of corporate law
shopping increases the incentive to engage in expost forum shopping
in bankruptcy because shareholders and managers placing the case
will have more to gain later on. In some situations, this may even be
worse from the creditors' point of view. Opportunistic bankruptcy
forum shopping under the EIR may be more difficult to predict than
corporate law shopping and cannot be prevented by contract."° If such
can be the outcome of relabeling, then one may question whether it is
at all wise for policymakers to engage in it. It may even be detrimental
to the position of creditors and thus raise the capital costs of firms. At
the very least, advantages and disadvantages of ex post choice-of-law
decisions in the two fields will need to be weighed against each other
with respect to particular issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
Following Centros, all Member States now must essentially defer
to private parties' choices with regard to corporate law."8 This has
liable member who is a natural person. See MoMIG, supra note 94, at 20-21 (proposing
INSO § 39(4)).
307. Creditors may sometimes be able to contractually reserve the right to replace the
board of directors if certain specified events occur and then eventually take full control of the
corporation, or they may practically have that power without a legally enforceable stipulation
to this effect, which will prevent forum shopping ex ante. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Essay, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA.
L. ReV. 1209, 1213-23 (2006). Needless to say, most creditors will be quite reluctant first to
reserve and then to exercise this form of protection. Furthermore, where such a protection is
exercised, this will benefit large financial creditors, whose interests may not coincide with
other creditor groups.
308. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
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already prompted regulatory arbitrage at the incorporation stage and,
following positive harmonization efforts by the EC, may soon make it
possible for existing companies as well. At the same time, the EIR has
deeply affected regulatory interactions in the realm of insolvency law
by increasing the opportunities for forum shopping. These two
developments together have significantly reshaped the regulatory
environment for the relationships between corporate debtors and their
creditors.
This Article has provided a picture of such a post-Centros, post-
EIR environment. We have shown that despite the positive
harmonization efforts by the EC, creditor-protection regimes still differ
across the EU, so that the regulatory surplus to be gained from
(re)incorporations is still large enough. Regulatory arbitrage at the
incorporation stage in order to escape minimum capital rules cannot
yet be taken as evidence for a race to the bottom because such rules are
outdated and provide no meaningful protection for creditors. We
cannot rule out the possibility that companies engage in midstream
reincorporations in order to exploit unsophisticated and nonadjusting
creditors. However, in the absence of a European Delaware, the odds
are against a US.-style, intense regulatory competition in this area of
law.
While the incorporation doctrine has been imposed upon
Member States with respect to corporate law, the EIR has de facto
harmonized conflict-of-law rules in the insolvency domain by picking
something close to the real-seat doctrine, i.e., the fuzzy COMI
standard. When a corporation incorporated abroad to take advantage
of more attractive corporate law rules goes bankrupt, the COMI's
insolvency law will have to apply together with the incorporation
State's corporate law. The Elk, with its emphasis on pure temporal
priority for the opening of the main proceedings, provides incentives
for a race to file between the corporate debtor and its creditors. This,
in turn, might prompt some Member States to reform their insolvency
laws so as to make them more favorable to managers and shareholders
in order to attract insolvency business. In light of the relevant interest
groups in action, we doubt that any Member State will have sufficient
incentives to engage in broad-scope regulatory competition.
Still, the policy goal of protecting creditors prevalent in many
Member States may tempt legislators to relabel corporate law rules so
as to make them applicable to pseudo-foreign entities. However,
relabeling requires insolvencification of the relevant doctrines,
meaning that they will have to apply only within the insolvency
HeinOnline  -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 645 2006-2007
646 TULANE LA WRE VIEW [Vol. 81:577
context and in close connection with the proceeding. Member States
will then have to decide whether the benefits of having those doctrines
(possibly duly tamed in order to pass the Gebhard test) applied to
bankrupt foreign entities outweigh the costs (if any) of not being able
to apply them to nonbankrupt domestic entities. Finally, as long as the
EIR does allow forum shopping and hence insolvency law arbitrage,
relabeling may increase the regulatory surplus a corporation can derive
from forum shopping through an opportunistic switch of COMI. This
may even increase the exposure of creditors to opportunistic conduct
by shareholders and managers and thus increase the cost of debt for all
companies with international operations. It is therefore doubtful
whether relabeling is actually desirable from the Member States'
perspective.
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